Realization and Recognition of Losses on Stock Surrenders: A Frolic Through Subchapter C by Griffith, Gwendolyn
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 2
Winter 1989
Realization and Recognition of Losses on Stock
Surrenders: A Frolic Through Subchapter C
Gwendolyn Griffith
Willamette University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gwendolyn Griffith, Realization and Recognition of Losses on Stock Surrenders: A Frolic Through Subchapter C, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 49
(2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol17/iss1/2
REALIZATION AND RECOGNITION OF LOSSES ON
STOCK SURRENDERS: A FROLIC THROUGH
SUBCHAPTER C
GWENDOLYN GRIFFITH*
A shareholder's surrender of stock to a corporation for no
consideration arguably results in a realized loss to the shareholder.
But should that loss be recognized? The Supreme Court's decision in
Fink v. Commissioner denied loss recognition for stock surrenders
resulting in only a small reduction in a shareholder's percentage
ownership in a corporation. While correct in result, the analytical
basis for this decision is problematic and offers a unique opportunity
to examine the basic issues of loss realization and recognition within
the context of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code.
S TOCK surrenders, in which shareholders surrender all or a portion
of their stock to the corporation for no consideration, occur for a
variety of reasons, but primarily in connection with the recapitaliza-
tion of a troubled company. Often, in a formal or informal recapitali-
zation, shareholders will surrender their stock in order to strengthen
the financial picture of the corporation, to induce outside persons to
invest in the corporation, or to allow a key employee to acquire stock
in the corporation.
After the stock surrender, the surrendering shareholder owns fewer
shares in the corporation, and if there is more than one shareholder, a
reduced percentage of stock ownership in that corporation. Because
no consideration is received for the shares, the surrendering share-
holder may claim that the surrender produces a loss in the amount of
the shareholder's basis in the stock surrendered. This loss would pre-
sumably qualify as an ordinary loss under section 165(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code,' since the shareholder did not "sell or
exchange" the shares. The creation of an ordinary loss under circum-
stances seemingly within the control of the shareholder is of concern
to the Internal Revenue Service, and also raises fundamental theoreti-
*Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; B.A., 1978, Rollins
College; J.D., 1981, Stanford University. The author thanks T.S. Morgan and Professor Nancy
Shurtz for their comments on prior drafts.
1. All section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, and the regulations thereunder.
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cal questions about the realization and recognition of losses in a
sound tax system.
These questions were ultimately presented to the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Fink,2 after becoming the subject of three divergent
appellate decisions.3 Part I of this Article examines these cases and
their Tax Court antecedents. Because stock surrenders share some of
the characteristics of a variety of other, more familiar, transactions
between shareholders and their corporations, it has been deceptively
easy for the courts to use these transactions as templates for determin-
ing the appropriate tax consequences for stock surrenders. For exam-
ple, in certain ways stock surrenders resemble capital contributions,
sales of stock, capital expenditures and even stock dividends. How-
ever, the resemblance between a stock surrender and any of these
other transactions is far from perfect. Therefore, relying on statutes
and the body of case law that evolved in dealing with these other
transactions ultimately leads to confusion in the stock surrender con-
text.
A more useful approach is to analyze loss recognition in the stock
surrender context just like any other loss recognition question. First,
has the surrendering shareholder realized a loss? If not, the inquiry
ends with no loss deduction. As explained below, stock surrenders
seem to result in realized losses. The second step is more complex. If
the taxpayer realizes a loss on surrender, does the Code allow recogni-
tion of that loss? Although section 165(a) would seem to allow a de-
duction for all realized losses, other Code sections may preclude or
defer recognition. Analysis of these sections determines the statutory
answer to the deductibility question. Part II of this Article examines
these issues, and concludes that the Code does not preclude recogni-
tion of losses realized in stock surrenders.
Even if the Code does not preclude recognition of stock surrender
losses, the question remains: Should stock surrender losses be deducti-
ble as a matter of policy? The proper allowance of capital recovery is
crucial to the accurate measurement of the taxpayer's income from
the corporate investment. On the other hand, premature allowance for
capital recovery can undermine the double tax system imposed by sub-
chapter C.4 Part III examines how subchapter C resolves these com-
peting concerns in a variety of contexts and concludes that for stock
2. 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
3. Fink v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1986) (deduction allowed), rev'd, 483
U.S. 89 (1987); Frantz v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 162 (1984) (deduction denied), aff'd, 784 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987); Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196
(5th Cir. 1979) (deduction denied), rev'g Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622 (1976).
4. Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. §§ 301-86 (1986).
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surrenders, the need to protect the integrity of the double tax structure
greatly overshadows the income measurement problem, and thus, de-
nial of loss is appropriate.
I. FROM SCOVILLE TO FINK
The issue of deductibility of losses on stock surrenders is not a new
one to the courts. Although the Tax Court allowed such losses in early
cases, the enactment of I.R.C. § 83 apparently precluded these deduc-
tions, at least for compensation related transfers. A trilogy of recent
cases brought the issue before the appellate courts,5 and ultimately be-
fore the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Fink.
A. Losses Allowed by the Tax Court
A cluster of cases arising in the 1920s brought the stock surrender
problem to the attention of the courts. 6 The "easy case" arose first:
When all the shareholders of a corporation surrender stock pro rata,
receiving in return no consideration, have they realized a loss on the
transaction? Presented with this situation in Scoville v. Commis-
sioner,7 the Tax Court found "no more loss than there is a gain in a
stock dividend." ' In the type of stock dividend to which the court was
referring, each shareholder receives additional shares but maintains
the same percentage interest in the corporation. After the pro rata sur-
render in Scoville, each shareholder had fewer shares but the same
percentage interest in the corporation. In this situation, according to
the court, the remaining stock of the shareholders absorbed the value
inherent in the surrendered stock, and thus, no loss occurred. 9
A slightly more difficult case arose in Wright v. Commissioner,'0 in
which a pro rata stock surrender occurred as an integral part of a
5. Fink v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1986) (deduction allowed), rev'd, 483
U.S. 89 (1987); Frantz v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 162 (1984) (deduction denied), aff'd, 784 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987); Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196
(5th Cir. 1979) (deduction denied).
6. The cases described in this section have been discussed extensively. See August & Lev-
ine, Sup. Ct. in Fink Holds Non-Pro Rata Stock Surrenders are Capital Contributions, 67 J.
TAX'N 130 (1987); Bolding, Non-Pro Rata Stock Surrenders: Capital Contribution, Capital Loss
or Ordinary Loss?, 32 TAX LAW. 275 (1979); Dickens, Is the Fink Decision Really What It Ap-
pears to Be?, 14 J. CoRP. TAX'N 55 (1987); Gebhardt, When are Loss Deductions Available on
the Voluntary Surrender of Stock?, 43 J. TAX'N 22 (1975); Johnson, Tax Models for Nonprorata
Shareholder Contributions, 3 VA. TA REV. 81 (1983); Keller, Frantz v. Commissioner: Non Pro
Rata Surrender of Stock to the Issuing Corporation, 38 TAx LAW. 739 (1985).
7. 18 B.T.A. 261 (1929).
8. Id. at 264 (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)).
9. Id. at 264-65.
10. 18 B.T.A. 471 (1929), aff'd, 47 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1931).
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transaction designed by a troubled corporation's bank to transfer ma-
jority ownership of the corporation to new managers selected by the
bank.11 The court observed that under the Scoville rationale, if the pro
rata stock surrender had occurred alone, no loss would have re-
sulted. 12 However, the effect of the entire transaction was a change in
the respective ownership interests of the corporation, which led to the
realization of a loss by the surrendering shareholders. 3 In a prescient
dissent, Judge Murdock questioned whether a shareholder taking
steps to avoid a loss could ever actually incur a loss. According to this
dissent, a surrendering shareholder forged a bond between the surren-
dered shares and the retained shares that could not be broken. 14 As a
result, the transaction should remain open until the shareholder dis-
posed of all of his shares; the loss (if any) could not be determined
until disposal of the entire investment. Judge Murdock's dissenting
opinion, however, was ignored in subsequent cases. Taxpayers were
allowed losses when shares were surrendered to the corporation for
transfer to others 5 and for cancellation by the corporation. 16 In these
cases, the courts viewed the shareholder's investment in the corpora-
tion as divisible into share units; disposition of any unit resulted in a
loss to the shareholder due to the change in the shareholder's percent-
age interest in the corporation. 7 This loss equalled the shareholder's
investment in the surrendered shares less the amount of benefit to the
shareholder's remaining shares. The character of the loss depended
upon the facts. If a sale or exchange had occurred, the loss would be
capital in nature, while in the absence of a sale or exchange, an ordi-
nary loss would be allowed. 8
One case in particular warrants attention. In Foster v. Commis-
sioner, 9 the taxpayer transferred half of his common shares in his
11. Id. at 472.
12. Id. at 473.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 473-74 (Murdock, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Northwest Motor Serv. Co. v. United States, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1557
(D.N.D. 1960); Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86 (1967); Budd Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner,
45 B.T.A. 737 (1941), acq. 1942-2 C.B. 3, rev'd on other grounds, 143 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 802 (1945); Miller v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 292 (1941), acq. 1941-2
C.B. 9, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1977-1 C.B. 2; Peabody Coal Co. v. United
States, 8 F. Supp. 845 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Burdick v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 742 (1930), nonacq.
X-2 C.B. 82 (1931), aff'd on other grounds, 59 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1932).
16. City Builders Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 800 (1930).
17. See Downer, 48 T.C. at 91.
18. E.g., Duell v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1381 (1960); Budd Int'l Corp., 45
B.T.A. 737; see also O'Brien, Stock Transfers by Shareholders to Outsiders for Nontangible
Consideration, 39 T.Axas 675, 675-83 (1961).
19. 9 T.C. 930 (1947), acq. 1948-1 C.B. 2.
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troubled corporation to a new investor and surrendered some 1,800
preferred shares to the company. He subsequently sold his remaining
shares, and the question arose as to the proper computation of the
gain on the sale: Did the basis of the shares include all or any part of
the basis of the surrendered shares? The Tax Court concluded that
only the disallowed portion of the loss on surrender, attributable to
the amount of benefit to the remaining shares, should have been
added to the basis of the remaining shares.2 0 Thus, the court implicitly
approved the result in previous cases of allowing the taxpayer a loss
for the difference between the cost of the surrendered shares and the
benefit to the remaining shares. 2'
B. Tilford v. Commissioner 22
The first inkling of a change in perspective came in Tilford v. Com-
missioner .2 Tilford involved a situation common in the earlier cases, a
transfer of stock to an employee, but. occurred after the enactment of
I.R.C. § 83.24 In this case, the taxpayer owned all of the stock of a
financially troubled corporation. He sought to motivate the corpora-
tion's employees by "selling" them blocks of his own stock at $1.00
per block and, as a result, claimed capital loss deductions in the
amount of the difference between his basis in the shares and the
"sales price." The Service disallowed the losses, asserting that they
were contributions to the capital of the corporation and constituted
transfers of property in connection with the performance of services
under section 83 of the Code. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the
taxpayer and held that the regulation on which the Service relied was
invalid .2
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, 26 finding the regulation,
which disallowed the loss claimed by the taxpayer, consistent with the
legislative history of I.R.C. § 83.27 Accordingly, the basis of the shares
was considered a contribution to capital. 2 Therefore, at least in the
context of compensation related transfers, the deductibility of stock
surrenders and transfers was called into question. Whether this hold-
ing was applicable in the traditional arena of stock surrenders, i.e.,
20. Id. at 937.
21. Id.
22. 75 T.C. 134 (1980), rev'd, 705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 83 (1982).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d) (1978); Tilford, 75 T.C. at 148.
26. Tilford v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992(1983).
27. Id. at 830.
28. Id.
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the transfer of stock to strengthen the financial condition of a trou-
bled corporation, remained for further consideration by the circuit
courts.
C. Schleppy, Frantz and Fink
Three recent court decisions revived the issue of deductibility of
losses on stock surrenders. In each of these cases, a shareholder of a
closely held corporation transferred stock to the corporation in an ap-
parent attempt to bolster the capital of the business. Faced with the
issue of the deductibility of the losses on surrender, the appellate
courts disagreed on the proper analysis to be applied to stock surren-
ders and on whether the loss should be deductible. The Supreme
Court resolved the issue in Commissioner v. Fink. 9
1. Schleppy v. Commissioner 0
In Schleppy v. Commissioner, two taxpayers (referred to here as the
taxpayer) were officers, directors, and shareholders of a Georgia cor-
poration (C & S) in which they owned, collectively, 810,500 of
1,155,833 shares outstanding, or 70.1207o of the stock. The remaining
29.88% of the stock was held by the public and a creditor of the cor-
poration. The corporation had issued $1,000,000 in debentures, con-
vertible into C & S stock at $7.00 per share, to Shareholders
Associates, Inc. (Associates). Associates threatened to call the notes,
which would have placed C & S in bankruptcy, unless the convertibil-
ity ratio of the notes was changed to $5.00 per share.3 The taxpayer's
counsel determined that a remote possibility existed that the minority
public shareholders of C & S could sue for mismanagement resulting
from dilution of shares, should the notes be converted at the new
rate.3 2 The taxpayer's surrender of sufficient shares to the company to
prevent dilution would avert this possibility. Such a surrender would
leave the taxpayer with 68.57% of the total outstanding stock of the
company. The Tax Court found, however, that the possibility of a
successful suit was so remote as to not be the dominant reason for the
transfer. Rather, the court found that the reason for the surrender
was that the company did not have sufficient stock to meet the new
29. 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
30. 601 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622 (1976).
31. Id. at 196-97.
32. Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622, 634 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Schleppy v. Commis-
sioner, 601 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1979).
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conversion ratio without additional issuance of stock, and the conver-
sion ratio change was necessary to keeping C & S in business.33
The taxpayer considered the stock surrender a realization event re-
sulting in recognition of an ordinary loss under section 165 of the
Code in the amount of the fair market value of the stock.34 The Serv-
ice disagreed, taking the position that no realization event had oc-
curred, but rather that the taxpayer had merely made a contribution
to capital of the corporation. Thus, as in any contribution to capital,
the basis of the surrendered stock was to be added to the taxpayer's
basis in his remaining shares.
The Tax Court followed the line of cases discussed above, holding
for the taxpayer. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed."
Suggesting that the Tax Court's reliance on Foster v. Commissioner3 6
and Downer v. Commissioner37 was misplaced," the court concluded
that no realization event had occurred. Presumably because of an in-
complete record, the court found that it was impossible to determine
when the transaction occurred, and thus, whether the taxpayers actu-
ally incurred a loss.39 More importantly, the court foreshadowed the
crucial issue of the Fink and Frantz decisions by suggesting that the
taxpayer enjoyed substantially the same position as a shareholder both
before and after the surrender: a less than two percent4° reduction
would simply not be significant enough to be considered a loss. 41 A
fundamental concern of the court was whether a loss had occurred at
all. In this particular case, the taxpayer's remaining shares presumably
benefitted from the surrender by some amount; the benefit was either
the taxpayer's post-surrender interest (68.570) in the book value of
the shares or the ultimate value of the surrendered shares to the cor-
poration (the amount of debt satisfied if the shares were converted
under the creditor's option, or the amount realized on sale of the
shares to some other party at the existing book value of the com-
pany). 42 Because it was impossible to determine the ultimate effect of
33. Id. at 642.
34. On his return the taxpayer had reported both a long-term capital gain in the amount of
the difference between the value of the stock surrendered and its basis, and ordinary loss in the
amount of the value of the stock. Id. at 641.
35. Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196, 196-99 (5th Cir. 1979).
36. 9 T.C. 930 (1947), acq. 1948-1 C.B. 2.
37. 48 T.C. 86 (1967).
38. Schleppy, 601 F.2d at 198.
39. Id.
40. The actual reduction was only 1.55%. Id.
41. Whether a de minimis rule exists in the realization arena is subject to some debate. See
infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
42. The issue of whether treasury stock is of value to the corporation, and if so, of what
19891
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the surrender, adding the basis of the surrendered shares to the basis
of the taxpayers' remaining shares would keep the transaction open
until this result could be known. 43
Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, ordinary loss treatment was
inappropriate. Presumably, the case did not preclude the allowance of
a loss in a situation fundamentally different from the facts of
Schleppy, in which, for example, the taxpayer's interest in the corpo-
ration was significantly reduced. 44
2. Frantz v. Commissioner 45
In 1971, a taxpayer acquired 13°%0 of the outstanding convertible
preferred stock of a troubled perfume company, Andree Baillot, Ltd.
(ABL), as part of the corporation's reorganization and agreement
with creditors. Subsequently he purchased 650'o of the outstanding
common stock as well. 46 The reorganization, however, did not result
in the desired effect. All of the inventory and accounts receivable were
pledged to creditors, the landlord was threatening eviction and addi-
tional funding was desperately needed. Counsel to ABL advised the
preferred shareholders to contribute their stock to the company to
make the corporation more attractive to outside investors. Only the
taxpayer agreed to do so, contributing to the company preferred stock
with a basis of $32,000. He reported a $32,000 ordinary loss for fed-
eral income tax purposes, but the Service objected, claiming that the
transaction was merely a contribution to capital. 47
The Tax Court noted both the taxpayer's reliance on its previous
decisions48 and the recent appellate disapproval of those decisions in
Schleppy v. Commissioner. "[Tihe time has come," the court stated,
"to reassess our position and to confess error if necessary." '49 The
court reversed its prior decisions by holding that the taxpayer had
made a contribution to capital, much as if he had contributed cash or
notes. First, the Tax Court explained the "fragmentary" view of
value, is problematic. In Schleppy, peculiar facts existed giving the treasury shares significant,
though contingent, value: the option price at which the creditor could convert the $1,000,000
debt. In the absence of such facts, whether the value of treasury shares could be established,
much less allocated to the remaining shares of the surrendering shareholders, is questionable.
Schleppy, 601 F.2d at 198-99.
43. Id. at 199.
44. Id. at 198-99.
45. 83 T.C. 162 (1984), aff'd, 784 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019
(1987).
46. Id. at 164-66.
47. Id. at 168-70.
48. See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
49. Frantz, 83 T.C. at 174.
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stock ownership. Under the fragmentary view, each share is a divisible
and independent investment in the corporation; thus, disposition of a
share "closes" the transaction and requires a determination of the tax
consequences of the disposition of that share. On the other hand, un-
der the "unitary" view, the shareholder's entire investment in the cor-
poration is viewed as a whole. Accordingly, only upon disposition of
that entire investment can it be determined whether gain or loss has
been realized.5 0 Because the intent of the taxpayer in a surrender trans-
action is to prevent or minimize a loss on his remaining investment in
other shares, the connection between the surrendered shares and the
retained shares justifies leaving the transaction open by adding the ba-
sis in the surrendered shares to the basis in the shares retained."
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.12 The court contrasted the
sale of shares by a taxpayer to a third party, in which the transaction
is clearly closed, with a surrender of stock, in which the transaction's
essential character is more ambiguous. It appeared to the court that
because the taxpayer's motive is to protect the value of his remaining
investment in the company, the surrender represents, paradoxically, a
continuation of his investment in the company. 3 The court found
such a situation analogous to a payment made to further an ongoing
investment, which is not deductible as a loss but rather is a capital
expenditure increasing the taxpayer's basis in the investment.5 4 The
same rationale would apply to a contribution of cash or other prop-
erty to a corporation by a shareholder," and should apply to the con-
tribution of shares.
The Second Circuit echoed the Schleppy court's concerns in ques-
tioning whether the surrendering shareholder suffered any loss at all.
The reduction of his interest in the corporation by only a "minuscule
amount" hardly justified a capital loss, much less an ordinary one.5 6
The court, however, specifically limited its holding to the situation of
a minor change in shareholdings and implied that when the change in
net equity was more significant, loss treatment might be found. 7
50. Id. at 180 (citing Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86, 95-96 (1967) (Drennan, J.,
dissenting)).
51. Id. at 180-81.
52. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 119 (2d Cit. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019
(1987).
53. Id. at 125.
54. E.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 12 (1974).
55. Perlman v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1958) (contribution of cash in the
form of cancellation of accrued but unpaid salary); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1980) (shareholder
cancellation of indebtedness).
56. Frantz, 784 F.2d at 125.
57. Id. at 126.
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The Second Circuit also noted the "practical and jurisprudential"
problems of both the fragmentary and the unitary approaches. 8 From
a practical standpoint, adoption of the unitary view might inhibit
stock transfers designed to improve the financial condition of ailing
companies and, thus, force them into bankruptcy. 9 On the other
hand, adoption of the fragmentary view could enhance the desirability
of a stock surrender because capital losses could be converted to a
more beneficial ordinary loss under the fragmentary approach. Thus,
rather than selling the shares or waiting for the stock to become
worthless, either of which would result in a capital loss, the share-
holder could surrender the shares and obtain an ordinary loss. Giving
controlling stockholders an option to convert capital losses into ordi-
nary losses at will simply did not appeal to the court. 60
3. Fink v. Commissioner, 61 The Sixth Circuit's Approach
With two circuit courts agreeing in Frantz and Schleppy on the
proper tax treatment of stock surrenders, the issue might have been
laid to rest. However, the taxpayer in Fink v. Commissioner claimed
an ordinary loss in circumstances similar to those of Frantz.
The taxpayer in Fink v. Commissioner was the principal stock-
holder in Travco Corporation, a Michigan corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of motor homes, recreational vehicles, and their
component parts. Travco prospered until the energy crisis of 1973 and
1974, which caused a decline in the market for Travco products. At
the time of the crisis, Travco enjoyed a line of credit with its bank of
approximately $3.4 million. When the bank became concerned with
the financial condition of Travco and threatened to call the loan,
Travco sought a new lender. A new bank offered attractive financing,
but required an infusion of new capital ($700,000 of equity and
$200,000 of subordinated debt) as a condition of the financing. 62
Travco had 1,536,146 shares outstanding of which the taxpayers,
Fink and his wife, owned 1,113,659, or 72.5%. The investment bank-
ers handling the recapitalization felt that new capital could more eas-
ily be attracted by offering control of the corporation to a new
investor. In order to do so, counsel advised the Finks to surrender
196,646 shares of stock to reduce the outstanding shares below 1.4
58. Id. at 124.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 125.
61. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 786 (1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 89
(1987).
62. Id. at 789.
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million. This would allow a new investor to acquire control of Travco
by investing $700,000 in new $1.00 par value preferred stock converti-
ble into 1.4 million shares of Travco common stock. 6
Fink and his wife surrendered 116,146 shares of common stock in
1976 and 80,000 shares of common stock in 1977. The surrender re-
duced their ownership interest in the corporation from 72.5% to
68.5%Wo. They reported an ordinary loss on their tax returns for those
years in the amount of the basis on the shares surrendered. The Serv-
ice objected on the now familiar theory that the surrender represented
a contribution to capital rather than a realization event resulting in a
recognizable loss.6
The Service prevailed in the Tax Court, based upon the appellate
decisions in Tilford, Schleppy and Frantz.65 The surprise came when
the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and allowed the Finks' ordi-
nary loss to the extent that the basis in the shares exceeded the incre-
mental benefit to the remaining shares. 6 After limiting its own
decision in Tilford to the specific legislative arena of I.R.C. § 83, the
court examined the Schleppy and Frantz decisions. The result in these
cases could only be correct, according to the court, if the unitary view
of stock ownership were adopted. But the fragmentary view, requiring
allocation of basis and recognition of gain or loss as a share by share
determination, was "firmly rooted in the tax law and in this court's
decisions" and the facts surrounding this surrender did not justify a
departure from that rule. 67 According to the court, each share of stock
represented a variety of rights, including the right to corporate earn-
ings and assets as well as the right to vote on matters of corporate
management. When the taxpayer disposed of the share, whether by
sale or surrender, these rights were irretrievably lost, and could not be
preserved by simply adding the basis of the surrendered shares to the
shareholder's remaining shares. The court observed that the Schleppy
and Frantz courts' willingness to allow a loss when the shift in share-
holdings was significant 68 illustrated their implicit acknowledgement
that a loss of some nature had occurred. Thus, the application of a
judicial "de minimis" rule disallowing recognition of a "small" loss
did not eliminate the loss. 69
63. Id. at 788-89.
64. Id. at 789-90.
65. Fink v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
66. Id. at 433.
67. Id. at 431.
68. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
69. Fink, 789 F.2d at 432.
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The court addressed the capital contribution theory by comparing
the effect at the corporate level of a capital contribution of money
and of stock. A contribution of money increases corporate capital,
but leaves the shareholder's proportionate interest in corporate capital
unchanged. Thus, the additional contribution represents an additional
price paid for the stock. A non pro rata contribution of stock has a
quite different effect in that corporate capital is not increased, and the
surrendering shareholder's interest in corporate capital is decreased.7 0
According to the Sixth Circuit, because a contribution of stock in no
way resembles a contribution of property, the tax consequences of a
capital contribution should not govern recognition in a stock contri-
bution situation.
The court acknowledged the possible practical problems, suggested
by the Frantz court, of allowing shareholders the option of converting
capital into ordinary losses through stock surrenders. However, the
judicial doctrines of business purpose, substance over form, and sham
transactions should be sufficient, according to the court, to prevent
such abuses. 7
1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Joiner72 objected to the majority's
distinction between the transfer of stock to a third party for services
in Tilford and the transfer of stock to the corporation. In his view,
because the transactions were essentially similar, their tax treatment
should be identical. 73 According to the dissent, the fragmented view
was inappropriate in the case where the motivation for the transfer
was to benefit the remaining shares because the "expenditure" is capi-
tal in nature and should be considered a capital contribution 7 4 partic-
ularly if the decrease in shareholdings was so minute as to be
illusory. 75
D. The Supreme Court Decision: Commissioner v. Fink76
The conflicts among the circuit courts set the stage for the Supreme
Court decision in Commissioner v. Fink. In the majority opinion,
Justice Powell first focused on the rule that no immediate tax conse-
quences arise from a voluntary contribution to capital 77 which applies
70. Id. at 433.
71. Id. at 432.
72. Id. at 433 (Joiner, J., dissenting). Judge Joiner was a senior district court judge sitting
by designation on this case.
73. Id. at 434-35.
74. Id. at 435.
75. Id.
76. 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
77. Id. at 94. Presumably the Court meant that this is not a recognition event, resulting in a
potential tax, although other tax consequences such as a change in basis do occur.
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not only to transfers of cash or tangible property, but also to a share-
holder's forgiveness of a corporate debt. 78 This rule reflects the gen-
eral principle that a shareholder may not claim an immediate loss for
outlays made for the benefit of the corporation. 79 Indeed, when a
shareholder makes a capital contribution of loss of property to the
corporation, no loss is incurred since the value formerly represented
by the property transferred is transformed into value of the shares
held by the shareholder. The question presented, according to the ma-
jority, was whether this principle should also apply to a surrender of a
portion of a controlling shareholder's stock.80
In answering this question, Justice Powell first likened the stock
surrender to an indirect contribution to capital. When a shareholder
forgives a corporate debt, the shareholder is treated as having made a
contribution to capital.8 ' Even though a loss is sustained, in the sense
that principal, interest and potential voting power in the event of
bankruptcy are lost, such losses are not currently deductible. Rather,
incurring an expense for the benefit of the corporation is treated as a
contribution to the corporation, and gives rise to no immediate tax
consequences 82
The majority opinion found the dissimilarities between capital con-
tributions and stock surrenders unimportant. Although financial ac-
counting does not treat a stock surrender as a contribution to capital
on the balance sheet of the corporation, the proper financial account-
ing treatment was not found to be sufficient reason to distinguish the
two transactions. Tax and financial accounting often differ;83 for ex-
ample, other types of transactions that qualify as capital contributions
for tax purposes, such as debt forgiveness, are not capital contribu-
tions in the accounting sense.84 The distinction in corporate net worth
was relegated to a footnote; 5 even though stock, as opposed to a con-
tribution of cash or a forgiveness of debt, is not considered an asset
that increases corporate net worth, this distinction did not impress the
Court. Furthermore, the distinction between a surrender, which
causes a change in the percentage ownership of stock, and a tradi-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 94-95.
81. Id. at 96-97.
82. Id.
83. While the method of accounting employed for financial purposes may be in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles, the Service will not be bound by a method if it
does not reflect income for tax purposes. E.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S.
687 (1961).
84. Fink, 483 U.S. at 97-98.
85. Id.at97n.ll.
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tional capital contribution, which does not, was not persuasive to the
Court,8 6 as not every change in ownership percentage results in imme-
diate tax consequences.87
The majority then addressed the issue of whether the Finks actually
sustained a loss during the taxable year as required by section 165 of
the Code. The Court noted that the ostensible reason for the surren-
der was to protect or increase the value of the remaining investment in
the corporation. 8 Ultimately, no loss would occur if the purpose were
achieved.8 9 Because no reliable method existed to determine whether
the taxpayer would ultimately sustain a loss or a gain on that invest-
ment, the transaction did not meet the requirement that a loss be sus-
tained during the taxable year. 9°
Finally, echoing the concerns of the Second Circuit in Frantz, the
Court remarked that allowing a deduction would encourage share-
holders of troubled corporations to convert potential capital losses to
ordinary losses through stock surrenders, or to transfer stock rather
than property to troubled corporations. 9 Therefore, the Court held
that the Finks could not deduct their basis in the surrendered shares
but rather would be required to reallocate that basis among their re-
tained shares. 92
In a single paragraph concurrence in the judgment, Justice Scalia
rejected the majority view that a stock surrender closely resembles a
contribution to capital. He preferred to characterize the transaction as
a capital expenditure made to "increase the value of ... property"
and, therefore, not deductible under section 263 of the Code. 93 Justice
Stevens' dissent, however, focused on the broader question of how
changes in the tax law should occur. The Finks had relied on a long
series of judicial rulings and administrative acquiescences in reporting
the ordinary loss on surrender. 94 If such interpretations were incorrect,
then Congress, not the courts, was the proper avenue for changing
established precedent. 95 Justice Stevens concluded by paraphrasing
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. It is questionable whether stock and property are interchangeable in this context.
92. Id. at 99-100. Interestingly, the Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether a
shareholder who actually gave up control through the surrender could deduct the loss. By analo-
gizing to I.R.C. § 302, the Court implied that if there had been a loss of control of the corpora-
tion, the result might have been different. Id. at 99 n.15. Justice White objected to this
distinction. Id. at 100 (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 100-01 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)).
94. Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 102-06.
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Justice Powell's dissent in Dickman v. Commissioner:96 "In my view,
the retroactive application of the Court's holding in a case like this is
unfair to the individual taxpayer as well as unwise judicial administra-
tion."91
II. REALIZATION AND RECOGNITION IN THE STOCK
SURRENDER CONTEXT
The determination of the proper tax treatment of stock surrenders
should not be all that difficult. According to the appellate courts,
identifying the essential nature of the shareholder's investment in the
corporation will naturally lead to the proper result. But a relationship
so imaginary has no essential nature that will dictate tax conse-
quences. The tax consequences of interactions between shareholders
and their corporations are the result of explicit and implicit choices
about tax benefits, tax burdens, and the timing of each. To illuminate
these choices and their implications for stock surrenders, we must re-
turn to the basic concepts of realization, recognition and capital re-
covery.
First, has a realization event occurred? In other words, has the tax-
payer suffered a loss in the sense of the income tax laws? Second, if a
loss producing realization event has occurred, is recognition of that
realized loss appropriate? More simply, should the transaction result
in an increase or decrease in taxes for the taxpayer at the time of the
event, or should these tax consequences be deferred until a later date?
Answers to these questions should make the "essential nature" in-
quiry irrelevant for resolving the stock surrender question.
A. Realization and Recognition
Realization is one of the more difficult concepts of our income tax
system, 9 essentially posing the question of timing: At what point is it
possible to determine that gain or loss has been incurred by a tax-
payer? One possible approach, guaranteed to reach all of the taxpay-
er's gains and losses, would be the periodic taxation of a taxpayer's
change in wealth by comparing wealth at the end of the period with
wealth at the beginning of the period and taxing the difference. 99 Vari-
96. 465 U.S. 330, 345 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. Fink, 483 U.S. at 106 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dickman, 465 U.S. at 353 n.l 1
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
98. See generally J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 65-72 (1967); D. PosIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS § 4.02 (1983); Mertens Law of Fed. Income Tax'n
(Callaghan) §§ 5.02-.04 (May 1989) (hereinafter Mertens).
99. J. SNEED, supra note 98, at 71 n.44.
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ous practical or perhaps political considerations, however, have pre-
cluded such an approach. Instead, our system has adopted a
"transactional" approach in which an exchange must occur (or be
deemed to occur) in order for income or loss to be realized. 100
Determining whether a taxpayer has incurred gain or loss through
an actual or deemed exchange has not been an easy matter for the
courts. The development of the concept of realization in the Supreme
Court illustrates a changing concept of income itself. The original
concept of realization as a constitutional requirement, requiring sever-
ance of income from capital, 10' has given way to a broader defini-
tion, 0 2 which simply requires a change in the form or the extent of the
property interest held by the taxpayer as a result of a transaction. 0 3
The Supreme Court has interpreted the realization concept quite
broadly, encompassing most changes in form or extent of property
interests, regardless of whether the taxpayer's economic or practical
relationship to the asset has changed. 1°4 While mere appreciation or
depreciation in the value of an asset does not result in realization 05
because no change in the nature of the property interest occurs, most
qualitative changes do result in realization events. This broad interpre-
tation of realization (within the constraints of the concept of the
transactional tax) has established Congress' expansive taxing power,
despite the apparently limiting language of the sixteenth amend-
ment. 106
100. The problem of valuing appreciating or depreciating assets is often given as the reason
for the adoption of the transactional approach to realization. See J. SNEED, supra note 98, at 71.
101. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court was presented with the question
of whether a pro rata stock dividend resulted in income to the recipient. Clearly, the taxpayer
was no richer on the day after the stock dividend than she was the day before, as the corporate
pie had simply been divided into a greater number of pieces. However, this was not the basis for
the Court's opinion. Rather, the Court held that since no money or other property had left
corporate solution, and thus, no income had been severed from the capital investment repre-
sented by the shares, the taxpayer had not realized income. Id. at 211.
102. The severance standard for realized income was short-lived. In Koshland v. Helvering,
298 U.S. 441 (1936), a preferred shareholder received a common stock dividend. The Court
abandoned the severance test in favor of the rule that the taxpayer need merely receive an inter-
est essentially different from that previously enjoyed in order to realize income. Id. at 446. Ac-
cord Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940). In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the
Supreme Court acknowledged that realization is simply a rule of administrative convenience re-
quiring only that the taxpayer take the "last step" to obtain the fruits of economic gain. Id. at
115. The development of the modern concept of realization has received generous attention by
the commentators. See, e.g., J. SNEED, supra note 98; Mertens, supra note 98; see generally R.
MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1945); D. PosiN, supra note 98.
103. E.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
104. See R. MAGILL, supra note 102, at 65-80; Marr, 268 U.S. 536; Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S.
242 (1924); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176
(1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
105. Mertens, supra note 98, at § 28.14.
106. See J. SNEED, supra note 98, at 71.
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The second issue, recognition, is also concerned with the timing of
taxation. But where the realization question asks whether it is possible
to determine a taxpayer's income or loss, the recognition question
asks whether the appropriate time has arrived for tax consequences to
flow from that determination. Section 1001 of the Code provides for
recognition of realized gains and losses on the sale or exchange of
property,'0 7 and section 165 of the Code specifically allows recognition
of losses, i.e., a deduction for all losses sustained during the year but
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. 0 Thus, in general,
recognition and the resulting tax consequences flow from a realized
gain or loss. The recognition rules or, more appropriately, the nonre-
cognition rules, can act as a congressional or judicial limit on the ex-
panded definition of realization.' °9 Even though gains or losses may
be realized, it may be more appropriate to defer the tax consequences
of the realization event. In certain cases, a congressional or judicial
determination may be made that the transaction should remain
"open" to defer reckoning of the ultimate gain or loss and the result-
ing tax consequences. The income tax laws in general, and subchapter
C in particular, mandate nonrecognition treatment for a variety of re-
alization events. ' 0 Determining just when nonrecognition treatment is
appropriate is no easy task, but it is crucial to the proper resolution of
the Fink dilemma.
B. Unitary versus Fragmentary View of Stock Ownership as
Questions of Realization and Recognition
In lieu of addressing the stock surrender situation in traditional
terms of realization and recognition, the appellate courts have focused
on the shareholder's investment in the corporation as either a unitary
or fragmentary investment in the corporation's stock. The fragmen-
tary view treats each share of stock as a separate investment in the
company, and accordingly, disposition of any share (whether by sale,
surrender, or other method) reduces the shareholder's investment and
107. I.R.C. § 1001.
108. Id. § 165(a).
109. According to Professor Sneed, the expanding concept of realization was a result of the
Supreme Court's attempts to establish Congress' broad power to tax despite the apparently limi-
ting language of the sixteenth amendment. Congress, in response to political concerns, was more
concerned with how that power was to be used and, therefore, developed the nonrecognition
provisions to avoid the implications of the broad concept of realization. See J. SNEED, supra
note 98, at 65-76.
110. For example, I.R.C. § 1031, although currently under Congressional attack, has tradi-
tionally allowed nonrecognition treatment for like kind exchanges. For a discussion of some
specific nonrecognition rules of subchapter C, see infra notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
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"closes" the transaction with respect to the investment represented by
that share. Thus, gain or loss is reckoned with respect to that share at
that time."' Under the unitary view, if a surrender of shares is made
to benefit the remaining shares, the "loss" is treated as an expendi-
ture designed to preserve the value of the remaining shares. Because
the effect of the stock surrender on the shareholder's investment in
the corporation as represented by the retained shares cannot be deter-
mined at the time of the stock surrender, there is no loss realization
under the unitary view." 2
The fragmentary and unitary views are more useful as illustrations
of the fundamental questions of realization and recognition than as
descriptions of the essential nature of the stockholder's investment in
a corporation. The fragmentary approach illustrates the general rule
that dispositions of stock, whether between individual taxpayers or
between the shareholder and the corporation, result in realization of
gain or loss to the shareholder. The unitary approach, however, while
acknowledging realization of gain or loss, limits recognition of real-
ized gain or loss in certain situations, relying on congressional man-
date. In order to resolve the stock surrender dilemma, it is useful to
focus on these questions: Do stock surrenders result in realization
events, and, if so, should the realized loss be recognized under the
general principles of recognition and nonrecognition provided by sub-
chapter C?
C. Stock Surrenders as Realization Events
The policy decision to have a separate tax on corporate income re-
quires that the corporation and the shareholder be considered inde-
11l. For example, the sale of shares to a third party would be a transaction in which the
fragmentary view would be appropriate. Frantz v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 119, 123-26 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987).
112. The courts have been understandably vague as to whether no realization event (loss) has
occurred, or whether a realization event has occurred but recognition is inappropriate. Both the
Schleppy and Frantz courts had difficulty seeing any loss at all, but suggested that if a share-
holder significantly reduced his interest in the corporation by giving up control, a loss might be
realized. Frantz, 784 F.2d at 126; Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1979).
The Sixth Circuit in Fink objected to this construction of the problem; either the surrender re-
sulted in a realized loss or it did not, but recognition is a separate question. Fink v. Commis-
sioner, 789 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 89 (1987). This distinction does not
affect the result to the taxpayer. If no realization event occurs, the taxpayer would have no gain
or loss to recognize, and would retain her total basis in the investment, allocated (presumably)
among the remaining shares. If a realization event had occurred, but recognition was inappropri-
ate, again no gain or loss would be recognized, but would be preserved for later recognition
through allocation of basis to the remaining shares. The distinction is important, however, in
determining the proper resolution of the stock surrender question.
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pendent taxable entities for federal income tax purposes." 3 Because a
shareholder and a corporation must be respected as separate entities,
they may, theoretically, deal with each other as unrelated parties in
various transactions. Examples of this fundamental principle abound.
A stockholder may buy property from or sell property to a corpora-
tion and may lend money to or borrow money from a corporation.
These transactions can, absent recharacterization, qualify as transac-
tions between unrelated parties. Furthermore, transactions in the cor-
poration's stock between the corporation and the shareholder are
often treated as transactions giving rise to possible income or loss.
Redemptions, liquidations and reorganizations are just three examples
of this principle, and as the ones most relevant to the stock surrender
situation, are discussed in some detail below. 1 4 The important point is
that transactions between the corporation and a shareholder in corpo-
rate stock can be considered transactions between separate entities
producing realized gain or loss.
The more specific question is whether the surrender of stock by the
shareholder to the corporation results in a realized loss. Faced with
similar facts, the Second and Sixth Circuits reached dramatically dif-
ferent answers to this question. The Second Circuit perceived no loss
at all," 5 while the Sixth Circuit found that the Finks had plainly suf-
fered a loss. 116
The realization question is essentially one of change: Was the Finks'
interest in Travco after the surrender essentially different, qualita-
tively or quantitatively, than their interest before the surrender? Prior
to the surrender, the Finks owned 72%7o of Travco stock; after the
transaction they owned 68%." The Service argued that this four per-
cent reduction did not represent an essentially different interest in the
corporation because the Finks remained in control of the corporation
after the transaction. Fink agreed that he and his wife remained in
control of the corporation," 8 but argued that control was not the only
relevant incident of stock ownership to be considered. In surrendering
four percent of the shares, the Finks had irretrievably given up two
113. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Re-
form, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 97 (1977).
114. See infra notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
117. Fink, 789 F.2d at 434 (Joiner, J., dissenting).
118. The taxpayers would have given up control of the company had the financing plan been
successful. Because losses are deductible only in the year sustained, the contingent divestiture
was not considered a current reduction in control giving rise to a loss. Commissioner v. Fink,
483 U.S. 89, 97-98 (1987).
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other important interests in the corporation: liquidation value and
dividend rights. If the corporation had been liquidated the day after
the surrender, they would have received four percent fewer assets. In
addition, their dividends would be reduced by four percent if the cor-
poration were to pay dividends. Thus, their interest in post-surrender
Travco was different, in both extent and form, than their interest
prior to the surrender.
The Service's emphasis on control, however, is not unwarranted. In
the close corporation context, in which the stock surrender cases al-
most always will arise, control through stock ownership may be cru-
cial to continued employment, compensation packages and other
benefit arrangements. Minor reductions in shareholdings will not re-
sult in any practical difference in corporate operations if the post-sur-
render ownership percentage exceeds the statutory minimum required
for major corporate decisions such as mergers, liquidations or the sale
of assets other than in the ordinary course of business. 119 In these
cases, the shareholder remains in effective control regardless of the
surrender.
To further complicate matters, the inability of troubled corpora-
tions to pay dividends lessens the importance of dividend payments in
the stock surrender context. Furthermore, because most or all of the
assets of troubled companies such as Travco will often be pledged to
creditors, current liquidation value may be illusory. These practical
realities suggest that the Service is correct in focusing on changes in
control to determine whether a taxpayer has an essentially different
interest in a corporation after a stock surrender. 120 However, several
arguments militate against focusing on control as the sole measure-
ment of an essential change in property interest.
Most fundamentally, in making the realization inquiry, the courts
have focused on whether a change of taxpayer interest has occurred,
not the magnitude of that change. No de minimis rule exists. The
119. For example, under Florida law, a dissolution requires the support of only a simple
majority of the voting stock. However, if provided for in the articles of incorporation, a major-
ity of each class of shares may be required. FLA. STAT. § 607.257(3) (1987). A merger also re-
quires only a simple majority of the voting shares, unless the articles of incorporation of either
of the old corporations, or the newly formed corporation, require a majority of each class. Id. §
607.221(2). By contrast, Texas requires a two-thirds vote of all shares of stock to approve a
merger or liquidation. TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 6.03 A(3) (Vernon 1980) (liquidations).
The articles of incorporation in Texas, however, may provide that the approving percentage be
greater or less than two-thirds, as long as the stated percentage exceeds 50%. TEx. Bus. CoRP.
ACT ANN. art. 9.08 A (Vernon 1980).
120. The Service took this position in Fink and Frantz despite the emphasis on liquidation
and dividend rights as crucial incidents of stock ownership in other contexts. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
79-163, 1979-1 C.B. 131.
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clearest example of this is the sale of a single share of corporate stock
by a shareholder for cash to an unrelated third party. In this situation,
a realization event occurs, which requires recognition of gain or loss
on the shareholder's investment in the corporation represented by the
stock sold. A transaction has taken place in which the selling share-
holder has received an amount of money in lieu of the share of stock.
Because money is an asset essentially different from stock, a realiza-
tion event has occurred and the shareholder realizes gain or loss on
the investment in the share. This is true regardless of whether the
stock sold represented a significant control interest, a realistic pros-
pect of dividends, or substantial liquidation rights.
The selling shareholder gives up the bundle of rights that accom-
pany that share, i.e., voting rights, dividend rights, and liquidation
rights, in exchange for cash. The Finks gave up a small percentage
(four percent) of similar rights in Travco but received nothing in re-
turn. Owning nothing is essentially different from owning that small
bundle of rights. Thus, it seems that a realization event had occurred
in the life of the Finks.' 2'
Finally, the Supreme Court's broad definition of realization pre-
cludes a restrictive interpretation of the change in the Finks' property
interest. The Court's path to a broad congressional taxing authority
was an expansive definition of realized gains. This expansive defini-
tion of realization allows tax consequences to flow from most transac-
tions, and places the decision of whether to tax squarely within the
political arena through the concept of recognition. Congress may re-
quire recognition of gain and allow recognition of loss; it may allow
nonrecognition of gain and mandate nonrecognition of loss; or it may
take a "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" approach by requiring gain recog-
nition and loss nonrecognition. The essential question for the Finks,
therefore, is not whether loss has been realized, but rather whether
Congress will allow recognition of it.
In Fink the Supreme Court appeared to acknowledge the realization
and recognition dichotomy, at least implicitly, by basing its decision
on recognition. 22 In discussing the capital contribution theory, 2 1 the
Court implicitly acknowledged that a realization event had occurred;
121. Furthermore, by taking the Service's argument that control is the sole determinative
factor to its logical extreme, then the stock of the minority shareholders becomes worthless. This
result is clearly contrary to both case law and statute. In general, stock becomes worthless upon
events that result in a total destruction of its value. This is established by an examination of all
the facts and circumstances of the situation which bear on value. E.g., Mahler v. Commissioner,
119 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941).
122. Fink, 483 U.S. at 99-100.
123. Id. at 94-96.
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every capital contribution is a realization event, which, but for spe-
cific Code provisions, will result in recognition of gain or loss. How-
ever, the Court's discussion of whether an economic loss had been
sustained12 4 is somewhat inconsistent with this view. Logic would seem
to dictate that a realized loss had been sustained, which was precluded
from recognition by a specific Code provision or judicial principle.
While this may be what the Court meant, it is not what the Court
said. Rather, the Court suggests that no loss has been sustained,
which, under the analysis above, would be incorrect. Finally, a similar
ambiguity exists in the Court's suggestion that a sizable surrender, re-
sulting in a loss of control, might result in a deductible loss.,2 5 The
determination of whether a loss has been realized, and, if so, whether
it should be recognized, becomes hopelessly complex. How much sim-
pler it would be to address the issue of realization and recognition
separately, acknowledging that a realization event has occurred and
addressing whether Congress has specifically limited recognition.
D. Recognition of Realized Loss
The answer to the recognition question depends on Congress' intent
as provided by statute. As noted above, 126 section 165 of the Code
allows a deduction for all losses incurred (realized) by a taxpayer and
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. This provides the gen-
eral rule that realized losses are to be recognized. The issue is whether
a specific limitation exists to prevent the recognition of the realized
loss in the particular situation. Because no Code section specifically
addresses stock surrenders, reference must be made to the more gen-
eral Code sections governing loss limitations. 2 7
1. Section 267: Denial of Loss on Sales or Exchanges Between
Related Parties
Section 267 of the Code defers recognition of an otherwise deducti-
ble loss if it results from a sale or exchange of property between re-
lated parties. 28 A related party includes a shareholder owning, directly
124. Id. at 96-97.
125. Id. at99n.15.
126. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
127. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 166, 267. While the passive loss limitations enacted by The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 might seem to limit the deductibility of losses on stock surrenders, in fact, these
limitations do not preclude the deduction. The definition of passive losses specifically excludes
"gain or loss attributable to the disposition of property" producing income such as dividends.
I.R.C. § 469(e)(l)(A)(ii).
128. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1).
STOCK SURRENDERS
or indirectly, more than 50% in value of a corporation's stock. 129 Al-
though the Service has invoked section 267(a) in disallowing losses on
redemption of stock, the use of the section to deny a deduction in
stock surrender situations is questionable because of the absence of a
"sale or exchange of property." Indeed, the Supreme Court opinion
acknowledged this problem, remarking that a "voluntary surrender,
for no consideration, would not seem to qualify as a sale or ex-
change."' 130 Some commentators have suggested use of a "deemed"
exchange in which the stock surrender is deemed to be in considera-
tion for the corporation's implied promise to locate outside inves-
tors.' While such an approach would produce a capital loss at best,
the Service has not found it necessary to rely on a deemed sale or
exchange approach. 13 2
The Code's failure to impute the missing sale or exchange element
to the stock surrender transaction is clearly inconsistent with its ap-
proach in similar areas. When a taxpayer's stock becomes worthless,
for example, I.R.C. § 165(g) provides the sale or exchange element to
the event of worthlessness so that the loss will be capital in nature.
Similarly, the withdrawal of a partner from a partnership for no con-
sideration or consideration in an amount less than the partner's basis
(whether by liquidation, abandonment or forfeiture) would appear to
create a capital loss because section 731(a) makes the transaction a
sale or exchange of a capital asset.
The Code requires capital loss treatment for such transactions in
order to prevent such losses from acting as a shelter to ordinary in-
come. In other words, these provisions require that losses attributable
to these assets will only offset gains from similar assets. Thus, these
provisions were the precursors to the passive loss provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.13 This rationale is equally applicable in the
stock surrender context because allowing an ordinary loss upon sur-
render of stock will offset such losses against income from sources
other than stock or similar capital assets. Because the taxpayer has
more control over the timing of a stock surrender than over the timing
of stock worthlessness, stock surrenders provide an even greater op-
129. Id. § 267(b)(2).
130. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 98 n.13 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 6, at 755.
132. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the Commissioner rejected
such an approach, preferring to bypass section 267 in favor of relying on the stock surrender as a
capital contribution or expenditure, which precluded realization or recognition of the loss alto-
gether. See Official Transcript of The Supreme Court of the United States at 11, Commissioner
v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (No. 86-511).
133. 26 U.S.C. § 469 (Supp. 1987).
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portunity for shelter than the purchase of soon to be worthless stock.
Accordingly, the Code could logically provide the missing sale or ex-
change element to conform the treatment of stock surrenders with the
stock worthlessness provisions. This treatment would produce capital
loss treatment within the limitations of section 267.
2. Section 263: Capital Expenditures
Section 263 of the Code denies deductions for capital expendi-
tures, 3 4 which are generally defined as amounts paid for new build-
ings, permanent improvements or betterments, or amounts paid to
increase the value of any property.'35 The usual capital expenditure is
a purchase of an asset. Purchases are generally not realization events
giving rise to income or loss. Thus, the first question is whether a loss
realization event can produce a "capital expenditure" at all. Events
giving rise to realized income or loss also may qualify as capital ex-
penditures, although it is often difficult to distinguish between a real-
ized, deductible loss and a realized loss constituting a nondeductible
capital expenditure. 3 6 The Service suggested two arguments to disal-
low the loss. First, the surrender of stock was essentially a contribu-
tion to the capital of Travco, and as such, was nondeductible.
Alternatively, the purpose of the contribution was to benefit the re-
maining shares, and therefore the surrender was a capital expendi-
ture. 37
a. Contribution to Capital
As discussed above,' 38 the contribution to capital of cash or other
property to a corporation by a shareholder would certainly be a trans-
action resulting in a change in interests, and thus, a realization event.
However, because the transaction is viewed as additional payment for
134. I.R.C. § 263(a).
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1987). The Regulations continue, providing:
In general [capital expenditures] ... include amounts paid or incurred (1) to add
value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of property owned by the taxpayer,
such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property to a new or different use.
Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs and maintenance of property are not
capital expenditures.
Id. § 1.263(a)-l(b).
136. E.q., Ingle v. Gage, 52 F.2d 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Commis-
sioner, 42 B.T.A. 539 (1940), aff'd, 122 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 822
(1942).
137. See Official Transcript of The Supreme Court of the United States at 9-24, Commis-
sioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (No. 86-511).
138. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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the corporation's stock, it is deemed a nondeductible capital expendi-
ture for which nonrecognition treatment is appropriate.'3 9 Thus, the
Treasury Regulations state that "voluntary contributions by share-
holders to the capital of the corporation for any corporate purpose"
are "capital investments and are not deductible."140
/" A contribution to capital may consist of cash or any other type of
property. If a shareholder intends to commit funds or assets to the
risks of the business, the shareholder has made a capital contribution,
regardless of the particular label affixed to the transaction.' 4' A capi-
tal contribution also may be made by a shareholder gratuitously for-
giving a debt of the corporation.' 42 The Supreme Court's selection of
this type of transaction as the proper template for stock surrenders
raises interesting issues.
The discussion of shareholder forgiveness of corporate debt in the
majority opinion begins with the generally accepted proposition that
when a shareholder makes an outlay to benefit the corporation, the
shareholder cannot claim a loss for the expenditure.' 43 What this really
means is that the shareholder may not claim a deduction for such an
outlay as an ordinary and necessary expense of carrying on a trade or
business under section 162 of the Code. Because of the long-standing
principle that the corporation and the shareholder are separate taxable
entities and must be respected as such,'44 the trade or business of the
corporation cannot be imputed to the shareholder to allow the share-
holder to deduct the expenditure.' 45 Rather, the shareholder must es-
tablish the deductibility of the expense as necessary to the
shareholder's own trade or business. Because the holding of stock for
investment purposes does not normally rise to the level of a trade or
139. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956), stating that voluntary pro rata payments by the share-
holders are "in the nature of assessments upon, and represent an additional price paid for"
stock.
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(f) (as amended in 1987).
141. The indicia of this intent to make a contribution to capital include the corporation's
need for additional equity, the expectation of equity growth from the contribution, whether the
contribution is voluntary and pro rata among the shareholders, and the form that the contribu-
tion takes. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 3.13, at 3-48, 3-49 (5th ed. 1987). See also United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 186
F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Cal 1960), aff'd, 308 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1962).
142. "In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is indebted to him gratuitously
forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution to the capital of the corporation to
the extent of the principal of the debt." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (as amended in 1980); see
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), aff'g 128 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1942).
143. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 94 (1987) (citing Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 669, 676 (1945), aff'd, 153 F.2d 301 (3d Cir.
1946)).
144. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
145. Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 494 (1940).
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business,'4 the taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction but instead must
capitalize the outlay, adding the expense to the basis of the shares.
Whether a similar limitation applies to losses was the problem faced
by the Court in Fink. Distinguishing expenses and losses is difficult
because both involve a parting with something of value by the tax-
payer, 47 and both expenditures and losses may take many forms. For
these purposes, however, a general definition of losses as a "[flailure
to keep that which one has' ' 48 will suffice in the sense that it implies a
prior capital investment that is impaired by some event.149
In searching for a loss event that is similar to a stock surrender, the
Fink Court focused on the position of a creditor of a corporation who
forgives the debt. 50 A creditor makes a capital investment in the
amount of the principal of the debt, and has an ongoing right to inter-
est payments. When the debt is forgiven, the capital investment and
ongoing income stream are lost, producing a loss which is capable of
recognition in accordance with the provisions of section 165 of the
Code. This seemed to the Court a logical choice for analyzing stock
surrenders because in the latter case the shareholder also loses both a
capital investment and a potential income stream.' 5 ' Historically, a
shareholding creditor has not been allowed a deduction for the loss
upon the forgiveness of a corporate debt. Instead, the forgiveness has
typically been characterized as a capital contribution by the share-
holder to the corporation,12 reflecting the resultant increase in equity
146. Id. at 495-96.
147. See Williamson v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1938); Fairmount Foun-
dry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1087 (1940).
148. Electric Reduction Co. v. Lewellyn, 11 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 1926) (quoting Foehren v.
German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 332, 66 A. 561 (1907)), rev'd, 275 U.S. 243 (1927).
149. A discussion of the infinite variety of events producing a realized loss is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Mertens, supra note 98, at § 28.05.
150. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 94-100 (1987).
151. Id.
152. The central issue for the courts has been whether the debtor corporation realizes income
on the forgiveness of the debt. Under prior law, two principal cases formed the basis for deter-
mining whether the debtor realizes income when a debt is forgiven. In Helvering v. American
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), aff'g 128 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1942), the gratuitous cancellation
by a taxpayer's creditors of rent and interest on debts owed was likened to a gift by the creditor
to the taxpayer, resulting in no income to the debtor taxpayer. Id. at 329-31. By contrast, in
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949), rev'g 164 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1947), the taxpayer
purchased his outstanding bonds for less than their face amount in arm's length transactions
with the holders of the bonds. The Jacobson Court limited American Dental Co. to those situa-
tions in which a gift was intended. Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 51. Under the Jacobson facts, the
taxpayer did not intend to transfer something for nothing; rather, he and his creditors were
simply trying to make the best possible deal to retire the taxpayer's outstanding indebtedness. Id.
The difference between the face amount and the acquisition price was not a gift from the credi-
tors to the taxpayer. Id. Therefore, under the American Dental Co. and Jacobson line of cases, a
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capital made available to the corporation by the forgiveness. Using
this approach in stock surrenders would preclude recognition of the
surrendering shareholder's loss, on the theory that the surrendering
shareholder "expends" the capital represented by the shares to benefit
the corporation. Although this theory offers an attractive means of
denying the Finks' loss, it ignores a basic difference between the two
situations. The economic consequences of a stock surrender differ
quite dramatically from those of a capital contribution. Net corporate
capital does not increase as a result of a stock surrender. The corpora-
tion may either cancel the surrendered shares or hold them as treasury
stock, but in either event, the stock has no intrinsic value (unlike cash
or other property) to the corporation except as a potential means of
raising capital. By contrast, in a capital contribution, the stockhold-
ers' equity increases as the assets held by the corporation increase.
gratuitous forgiveness of debt is a gift, resulting in neither income to the debtor nor a realization
event to the creditor. On the other hand, a nongratuitous forgiveness results in income to the
debtor and a realization event to the creditor. The Treasury Regulations incorporate this distinc-
tion by providing that the gratuitous forgiveness of indebtedness by a shareholder results in a
capital contribution to the debtor corporation. See supra note 142. By negative implication, the
nongratuitous forgiveness of indebtedness does not result in a capital contribution.
Section 108(e)(6) of the Code now statutorily incorporates this distinction. The general rule
that income will result from a discharge of indebtedness applies when a shareholder forgives a
corporate debt "as a contribution to capital," but the corporation is deemed to have satisfied
the debt with an amount of money equal to the shareholder's adjusted basis in the indebtedness.
I.R.C. § 108(e)(6)(B). Shareholder forgiveness of debt which is not made as a contribution to
capital is governed by the general discharge of indebtedness rules. Thus, in any situation in
which a shareholder forgives a loan to the corporation, the first question is whether this action
occurred as a contribution to capital.
A shareholder makes a contribution to capital when the action of forgiving the debt relates to
her status as a shareholder. If the shareholding creditor were merely trying to maximize satisfac-
tion of a claim, no contribution to capital would occur. To distinguish between the two, an
analysis of all of the facts and circumstances of the situation must be made. SENATE CoMM. ON
FiNANcE, BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980, S. Rap. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 n.21,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7017, 7033 n.21. Even though the Commit-
tee Reports specifically state that no commercial gift exception is intended to discharge indebted-
ness income, the analysis required for a capital contribution closely resembles the Jacobson
Court's distinction between a gratuitous and nongratuitous transfer: The inquiry into each trans-
action must be a factual one, turning on whether it is a transfer of something for the best price
available, in which case no gift occurs, or whether it is intended to be a transfer of something for
nothing. Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 51.
The tax treatment of the forgiving shareholder has taken a back seat to the primary issue of
whether the debtor has income. However, upon forgiveness of a debt, a shareholder may claim
an ordinary or capital loss in the amount of the forgiven debt. For example, in Perlman v.
Commissioner, 252 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1958), a corporation accrued but did not pay a portion of a
shareholder/employee's salary. The shareholder nevertheless included the amount in income. In
a later year, the shareholder reluctantly agreed to forego the unpaid portion altogether, because
payment would have jeopardized the financial position of the company. He then claimed an
ordinary loss in the amount of the forgiven debt. The Second Circuit succinctly characterized
this amount as a contribution to capital, and as such nondeductible. Id. at 892.
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This is also true of forgiveness of debt owed to a shareholder by the
corporation because it becomes part of the equity of the corporation,
increasing the corporation's net worth, just as if the funds had been
contributed directly as capital. Furthermore, a stock surrender results
in a transfer of value from the surrendering shareholder to the non-
surrendering shareholders: although corporate capital remains con-
stant, a portion of that value is transferred to the other
shareholders. 5'
These distinctions are crucial because the rationale for nonrecogni-
tion in capital contribution cases is absent from stock surrender situa-
tions. The recognition system governing capital contributions allows
the shareholders to do after the fact what they could have done in the
creation of the corporation, with the same tax consequences. In a cap-
ital contribution, the shareholders may transfer additional property
pro rata to the corporation; they will recognize none of the lurking
gain or loss inherent in the asset and will add to the basis in their
stock the basis of the asset transferred. Similarly, any shareholder
may make a non pro rata contribution, recognizing no gain or loss on
the transfer of the asset and adding the basis of the property trans-
ferred to the share basis. Corporate capital will increase, and a por-
tion of the value will be transferred to the other shareholders because
the contributing shareholder does not take additional stock.
153. The Supreme Court failed to find this distinction convincing, stating that it had "never
held that every change in a shareholder's percentage ownership has immediate tax conse-
quences." Fink, 483 U.S. at 97-98. The Court is indeed correct in stating that not every change
in percentage ownership results in recognition. While a sale of shares among shareholders to
effect a reallocation of ownership would certainly result in recognition, certain other transac-
tions will not produce immediate tax results. For example, a simple non pro rata stock dividend
will not result in a recognition event to the recipients. I.R.C. § 305(a). In contrast, the distribu-
tion of cash or other property to the shareholders who did not receive stock will transfer the
transaction into a taxable event for the stock recipients. Id. § 305(b)(2).
The statutory recognition scheme for stock dividends is rather complex. See B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 141, at 7.40-.44. This complexity is a function of the tension between (l)
the continuing expansion of the realization doctrine, see supra notes 98-110 and accompanying
text, in light of transactions in which no assets leave corporate solution, and in which the recipi-
ent is in no better situation (a scenario in which nonrecognition is appropriate); and (2) the
continuing imagination of lawyers who create stock dividends which grant shareholders the ben-
efits of a dividend without dividend treatment (a scenario in which recognition is appropriate), in
particular the preferred stock bailout. See Clark, supra note 113, at 118-20. It is not the change
in percentage interests that is crucial but rather the potential for bail out of earnings. The change
in percentage interests is only one indicia of bail out potential. Applying this recognition scheme
to determine the tax fate of a stock surrender, however, seems rather inappropriate because the
bail out of earnings is not the objective of the action. A capital contribution, even if non pro
rata, also results in a transfer of value from the contributing shareholders to the noncontributing
shareholders, but the item transferred is a portion of the increase in corporate capital, not a
portion of the shares.
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Doctrinally, Congress and the courts have explained nonrecognition
of realized gains in the organization/capital contribution situations as
a response to the idea that corporate organizations are mere changes
in form, not substance, and as such, should not be subject to tax. 15 4 If
this were true, the elective characteristics of section 351 of the Code'
would hardly seem appropriate; transferors can recognize losses inher-
ent in transferred assets by structuring the transaction to fall outside
the requirements of section 351 of the Code or constructing the trans-
action as a sale. 56 Rather, it is more likely that the optional nonrecog-
nition rules applicable to a organization/capital contribution situation
simply facilitate the pooling of resources in corporate form through-
out the corporate lifetime, probably in response to Congress' notions
of optional industrial organization and in order to collect corporate
taxes, a significant source of revenue. 57 Imposing a tax on the contri-
bution of property or disallowing losses on such contribution would
interfere with creation of corporations, and thus, the quasi-elective
nonrecognition rules apply.
The traditional justifications for nonrecognition in the organiza-
tion/capital contribution contexts do not apply in the stock surrender
situation. Because no increase in corporate assets occurs, there is no
mere change of form of any assets to require a nonrecognition rule.
Similarly, a stock surrender involves no additional pooling of re-
sources that would be encouraged by a nonrecognition rule. In sum-
mary, the essential problem of using capital contribution theories as
the template for stock surrenders is that stock surrenders simply are
not capital contributions. Indeed, applying the rules developed for
capital contribution situations to stock surrenders does not make
sense because the concerns producing those rules are not present in the
stock surrender case. A more productive path might be found in the
rules developed specifically to limit losses in the capital expenditure
context.
154. Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940).
155. I.R.C. § 351 provides nonrecognition treatment to realization of recognized gains and
losses if the specific requirements of that section are met. If these requirements are not met,
recognition is required. Because planning for recognition or nonrecognition is relatively easy,
section 351 has a somewhat elective aura. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 141, at
3.10.
156. However, the transferor may be precluded from taking a loss due to I.R.C. § 267 or its
judicial penumbras. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). See, e.g., Ellis, Tax Problems in
Sales to Controlled Corporations, 21 VAND. L. REV. 196 (1968).
157. The corporate income tax became a significant source of federal revenue, raising $21
million in 1909, the year of its enactment, and increasing to $35 million by 1912. S. RANTER,
AMERICAN TAXATION 297 (1942).
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b. Capital Expenditures
The better argument for the Service in the stock surrender situation
is that the stock surrender should not be viewed as a closed and com-
pleted transaction. Rather, even though a loss may have been realized
through the surrender of stock, this loss is a capital expenditure and is
therefore nondeductible. The majority opinion in Fink touched upon
this issue as part of its overall discussion of the capital contribution
theory,'58 and Justice Scalia specifically rejected the capital contribu-
tion theory as a basis for his concurrence in the result, preferring in-
stead the more general capital expenditure theory, without any
discussion of the rationale for his preference.15 9
The capital expenditure argument assumes that because the taxpay-
er's purpose is to avoid loss of the equity investment in the company,
recoupment of the capital represented by the surrendered shares is rea-
sonably anticipated. When recoupment is reasonably likely, no loss is
recognized, and the transaction remains open until it is possible to
determine whether recoupment has occurred. Few analogous situa-
tions appear to exist, but the building demolition cases and regula-
tions offer some examples. In these cases, the taxpayers acquired
property upon which old buildings were located. They demolished
these buildings for various reasons, including to construct a new
building' 60 and to make the land available for parking.61 The question
presented in these cases was whether the loss incurred in demolishing
the building (costs of demolition and the unrecovered basis of the
building) were currently deductible or were to be added to the basis of
the land or new building. The Treasury Regulations reflected the judi-
cial approach to the problem. Accordingly, if the building and the
land on which it was located were not acquired with the intent to de-
molish the building, it was appropriate to allocate a portion of the
purchase price to the building. Subsequent demolition resulted in a
deductible loss to the extent of unrecovered basis in the property and
the costs of demolition. 162 However, if the taxpayer acquired the land
with the intent to demolish the building, these costs were to be added
to the basis of land on which the demolished structure was located. 163
In recognition of the problems inherent in any intent inquiry, Con-
158. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 97-98 (1987).
159. Id. at 100-01 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
160. Commissioner v. Appleby's Estate, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
161. Garrett v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 879 (1966).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1976).
163. Id. § 1.165-3(a)(1); e.g., Fillmore Gardens Shopping Center, Inc. v. United States, 327
F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Va. 1971); Garrett, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 879.
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gress amended section 280B of the Code requiring all costs of demoli-
tion, including the basis of the demolished structure, to be capitalized,
regardless of intent.'6
But prior to the enactment of section 280B, the courts approached
the problem of capital expenditure versus deduction posed by these
cases as a question of closure. When the taxpayer's plan at the time of
purchase was to demolish the structure, it was clear that the taxpayer
received value for the old building at least equal to the taxpayer's in-
vestment by substituting a more valuable asset (the newly erected
building or the parking lot, for example) for the old asset. Substitu-
tion of a more valuable asset does not lead to loss because the invest-
ment of capital in the old asset is reasonably likely to be recouped by
substitution of the new asset.' 65 Recoupment is reasonably likely be-
cause the taxpayer simply would not have consummated the transac-
tion unless the value of the new asset exceeded, or had the prospect of
exceeding, the value of the old asset. Therefore, the transaction re-
mains open with respect to the investment until ultimate disposition.
These cases may be contrasted with those in which the demolition
decision was made in response to defects discovered after purchase or
other subsequent events. In such situations, losses were allowed on the
theory that no substitution of assets had occurred.66 Since the demoli-
tion occurred to protect the value of the original investment rather
than to create a new and different asset, the transaction could prop-
erly be considered closed with respect to the old asset, and thus, loss
could be recognized.
The issue presented may best be understood as the loss analog to
the expense versus capital expenditure question presented by the more
common repair cases. In the repair cases, the question of closure
again arises, but is couched in terms of whether a significant expense
giving rise to benefits that last beyond the taxable year is a capital
expenditure or a deductible expense. In Midland Empire Packing Co.
v. Commissioner, 67 for example, the taxpayer constructed a concrete
sheath for its meat storage basement to protect the meat from oil
seepage emanating from a nearby refinery, which, left unchecked,
would have endangered the taxpayer's entire operation. While an ex-
penditure of this type might ordinarily be considered a capital expen-
164. I.R.C. § 280B (as amended in 1984).
165. Commissioner v. Appleby's Estate, 123 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1941).
166. E.g., Union Bed & Spring Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1930); Chesbro
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 123 (1953), aff'd, 225 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
995 (1956).
167. 14 T.C. 635 (1950); accord American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361
(1948).
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diture because of its usefulness beyond the current year, the court
focused not on the nature of the expenditure itself, but rather on the
taxpayer's purpose in expending the funds and the ultimate economic
result. The taxpayer's purpose was protection of its ongoing plant op-
erations and the expenditure itself resulted in no new or different asset
in form or in function. 68 Therefore, the expenditure qualified as a
deductible repair expense rather than a capital expenditure.169
In both the demolition and repair cases, no inquiry is made into the
possibility of recovery of capital, however likely or remote that possi-
bility might be. This may result from the difficulty in determining the
likelihood of such recovery.170 The distinction remains that losses and
expenses incurred for the purpose of "repairing" the ongoing invest-
ment are deductible while expenditures for creating, enlarging or
changing an investment are properly chargeable to the capital ac-
count.
Applying these principles to the stock surrender situation, it appears
that both the Service and the courts are indeed focusing on the tax-
payer's purpose in determining whether a capital expenditure has been
made in the stock surrender context. However, the taxpayer's purpose
must be analyzed in terms of the possibility of recoupment of the cap-
ital invested in the surrendered shares. If the purpose (and result) of
the transaction were the substitution of a new, enlarged or different
asset for the surrendered shares, the capital expenditure limitations of
section 263 of the Code should apply to keep the transaction open
until disposition of the remaining shares, because recovery of the capi-
tal investment in the surrender shares is reasonably likely. However, if
no such substitution has occurred, because the taxpayer's purpose was
merely to maintain the value of the ongoing investment, without sub-
stitution, the result of the closed and completed transaction should be
a deductible loss.171
In the usual stock surrender cases, protection of the taxpayer's on-
going investment, not substitution of a new, different or enlarged in-
168. Midland Empire Packing Co., 14 T.C. at 642.
169. Id. at 642-43.
170. On the other hand, this construct may be a tool designed to encourage taxpayers to
maintain their investments in good repair and to keep the investment afloat for as long as possi-
ble.
171. The substitution doctrine provides an alternative means of analyzing the forgiveness of
debt problem discussed above. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. When the share-
holder creditor forgives the debt, the question arises whether the taxpayer has substituted an-
other asset, the equity investment, for the forgiven loan. Because of the different nature of the
equity and debt assets, the substitution doctrine would appear to properly preclude loss recogni-
tion. Such analysis allows continuing respect for the different roles of the shareholder and credi-
tor, unlike the gratuitous/nongratuitous rationale.
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vestment, is the taxpayer's motive. The motivation of the taxpayer
may be explained as preservation of the capital investment in the re-
maining shares, not the surrendered shares, as an alternative to loss of
the total investment. No substitution of a more valuable asset for a
less valuable one actually occurs in the stock surrender situation be-
cause the taxpayer neither acquires a new asset7 2 nor changes the
form of investment. No reasonable prospect exists for recovery of the
capital invested in the surrendered shares, because the mere possibil-
ity, however likely, that the remaining shares will absorb the loss
through subsequent appreciation or profitability does not, according
to accepted doctrine, make recoupment of the investment reasonably
likely. This seems to be the correct result because of the difficulty in
predicting whether the remaining shares will appreciate in value. Fur-
thermore, because surrenders are like repairs to the stock investment,
encouraging repairs through surrender will encourage investors to
keep their investments afloat for as long as possible. Therefore, it ap-
pears that the loss realized by the Finks is not properly characterized
as a capital contribution or other capital expenditure, and thus, no
specific statutory constraints exist on the deductibility of this loss.
III. RECOGNITION OF LOSSES ON STOCK SURRENDERS WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF SUBCHAPTER C
Although no specific statutory provisions appear to constrain the
recognition of losses on stock surrenders, the question remains
whether such recognition is appropriate. Answering this question
changes the mode of analysis from likening a stock surrender to other,
more familiar, transactions (the approach favored by the courts) to an
inquiry into how stock surrenders illustrate the recurrent problems of
the corporation/shareholder relationship that subchapter C seeks to
resolve. 173
A. Subchapter C
When a transaction involves only events at the shareholder level or
only events at the corporate level, the proper tax consequences of the
transaction can be determined without reference to subchapter C. For
example, the sale of shares by a shareholder to another person in-
volves only a shareholder level transaction, and the shareholder's gain
or loss is determined by reference to I.R.C. § 1001, possibly limited by
nonrecognition provisions of sections such as I.R.C. § 267. Subchap-
172. In fact, the shareholder's investment is decreased.
173. See generally Clark, supra note 113, at 92-94.
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ter C, however, addresses the more problematic transactions, i.e.,
those between the corporation and the shareholder. The creation, op-
eration and termination of the corporation require many such transac-
tions, which raises fundamental questions regarding whether
recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss is appropriate.
Specifically, recognition questions often involve the timing of capi-
tal recovery deductions 174 for a shareholder's investment in a corpora-
tion. The creation of the corporation results in two taxable entities,
the corporation and the shareholder. The shares received in the ex-
change, or subsequently, represent the taxpayer's capital invested in
the corporation, and capital recovery is not allowed on such shares
until disposition. This raises the question of what constitutes a dispo-
sition that will trigger capital recovery. When a sale or exchange is
made to an unrelated party in a transaction that merely substitutes
one shareholder for another, a disposition clearly occurs. The more
difficult question is whether a disposition by a shareholder to the cor-
poration is an appropriate time for capital recovery. Subchapter C ad-
dresses this issue for several different transactions. For example, the
exchange of shares for assets upon liquidation of the corporation is
obviously an appropriate time to allow capital recovery of the amount
invested in the shares because the shareholder's investment in the cor-
poration terminates.' 7 Similarly, section 165 of the Code provides
that the worthlessness of corporate stock is an appropriate time for
capital recovery, treating the worthlessness as a sale or exchange of
the stock. 176 Because of the worthlessness of the shares, the capital
allocable to them will never be returned to the shareholder. Therefore,
worthlessness can be likened to liquidation as an appropriate time for
capital recovery because the shareholder's investment in the corporate
venture is terminated.
Congress might have determined that a shareholder's capital recov-
ery is inappropriate at any time short of liquidation or worthlessness
174. The timing of capital recovery, not its absolute availability, is the question that most
often plagues the Service and the courts, and is the subject of statutory attention. See, e.g., Inaja
Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 727 (1947), acq. 1948-1 C.B. 2. The question for the share-
holder is at what point in time the value of the capital invested may be deducted, either against
income produced by the investment, or against other income if the investment produces no in-
come. Shareholders prefer capital recovery to occur as soon as possible, while the Service prefers
the opposite approach.
175. I.R.C. § 331.
176. Section 165(g)(1) of the Code allows a capital loss from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset for a security (including stock, I.R.C. § 165(g)(2)(A)) that is a capital asset and becomes
worthless during the taxable year. This provision is not within the purview of subchapter C
because the sale or exchange need not be deemed to be between the corporation and the share-
holder.
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of the shareholder's interest in the corporation, but it did not. In-
stead, the rules of subchapter C allow capital recovery at some points
prior to liquidation or worthlessness. Subchapter C generally makes
capital recovery in shareholder/corporation transactions dependent
upon a meaningful change in the relationship between the corporation
and the shareholder, i.e., the withdrawal of a significant measure of
the capital from the corporate model by its return to the shareholder.
In the absence of such a withdrawal, capital recovery must be de-
ferred.
1. Capital Recovery in Corporation/Shareholder Transactions
This principle can be illustrated by subchapter C's approach to the
various corporation/shareholder transactions that typically occur dur-
ing the life of a corporation. All of these transactions illustrate the
recurrent problem of timing capital recovery.
Most of these transactions involve exchanges between the share-
holder and the corporation in which the shareholder receives some
payment from the corporation with respect to the shareholder's stock.
The proper characterization, of distributions to shareholders with re-
spect to their shares either as corporate earnings, which are subject to
the double tax, or as a tax-free return of capital is the crucial issue.
While pro rata distributions of earnings and profits from ongoing cor-
porations to shareholders are usually dividends, and distributions in
liquidation usually represent, in whole or in part, a return of capital,
the most difficult transactions lie somewhere in between these two
clear cases. Each distribution must be examined for its essential char-
acteristics as a dividend or return of capital. This issue arises most
clearly in the case of redemptions.
In a redemption, a shareholder exchanges stock for cash or other
property from the corporation. The essential question is whether the
distribution from the corporation to the shareholder represents a re-
turn of capital or a distribution of corporate income, i.e., a dividend.
If the distribution is classified as a dividend, the shareholder must in-
clude the full amount of the distribution in income, to the extent of
the shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's earnings and
profits. 177 However, if the distribution is classified as an exchange of
177. I.R.C. §§ 301(a), (c), 302(a). To the extent the shareholder does not recover the full
amount of the basis in the shares, because the distribution is treated as a dividend, the better
view appears to be that the leftover basis is added to the basis of the remaining shares rather
than simply disappearing. See generally Kahn, Stock Redemptions: The Standards for Qualify-
ing as a Purchase under Section 302(b), 50 FORDHAm L. REv. 1 (1981); Blumstein, When is a
Redemption "Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend"?, 7 J. CoRp. TAX'N 99 (1980).
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stock, the shareholder will be entitled to tax-free recovery of basis,
and the gain will be classified as capital gain. 178
Section 302 of the Code distinguishes between dividend distribu-
tions and exchanges in order to prevent the unwarranted "bail-out"
of corporate earnings as disguised distributions of capital and capital
gain. The history of section 302 illustrates the difficulty in making a
determination that satisfactorily distinguishes between the two and
provides adequate guidance for taxpayers contemplating a redemption
while also protecting the integrity of the double tax base. 7 9 The cur-
rent statutory scheme provides a safe harbor test for such a reduction
that insures a meaningful reduction in shareholder interest8 0 as well as
a more flexible test for redemptions outside the safe harbor. 8' A com-
plete termination of shareholder interest will always qualify as an ex-
change entitled to capital gain treatment since the shareholder is truly
giving up all benefits of the corporate form for the investment.182
While the tests of section 302(b) differ in scope and application, they
are all designed to allow exchange treatment only when there has been
a meaningful reduction in shareholder interest as measured by the
shareholder's pre- and post-redemption interest in voting power, earn-
ings and assets. Otherwise, the amount distributed will be a dividend
to the shareholder, and subject to taxation, regardless of the reduction
in shareholdings accomplished by the redemption.'83
Redemption exchanges that result in a gain require dividing the dis-
tribution into its income and capital components so that capital may
be recovered tax-free. Redemption exchanges that produce a loss,
where the total distribution is less than the basis in the redeemed
shares, raise an identical question of capital recovery, i.e., whether the
178. I.R.C. § 302(a).
179. See generally S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-49 (1954).
180. Section 302(b)(2) of the Code treats redemption proceeds as gain from the sale or ex-
change of stock rather than as a dividend if the redemption is "substantially disproportionate."
A substantially disproportionate redemption is one in which (1) the shareholder's total owner-
ship of all classes of stock after the redemption is 80% of the shareholder's previous ownership,
(2) the shareholder's voting stock is 8007o of the shareholder's previous ownership, and (3) the
shareholder controls less than 50% of the voting shares after the redemption. Constructive own-
ership principles apply to determine reductions under these rules. I.R.C. § 302(c).
181. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
182. If a shareholder's interest in a corporation is completely terminated, the transaction will
qualify as an exchange under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). In order to completely terminate an interest, the
shareholder must give up all shareholdings owned directly or indirectly through constructive
ownership. However, the shareholder may waive family attribution so that constructive owner-
ship is not considered in determining whether an exchange qualifies provided the shareholder
agrees not to acquire a prohibited interest in the corporation within the ten years following the
exchange. Id. § 302(c)(2).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), Example (1) (1955).
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redemption represents a complete return of capital, so that proper
measurement of the overall income of the taxpayer requires recogni-
tion of the loss. When the consideration paid by the corporation for
the shares is less than the basis of the shares, will the redeeming share-
holder be entitled to claim a (capital) loss on the transaction? Al-
though section 267 would disallow the shareholder's loss entirely if the
redeeming shareholder and the corporation were "related parties,"1
4
absent application of section 267 and a tax avoidance purpose, the
loss should be allowable, if the transaction meets the requirements of
section 302.185 In other words, such a transaction should be classified
as an exchange regardless of whether gain or loss is realized on the
transaction, and absent application of other Code sections denying
recognition of a loss, a shareholder's redemption loss should be de-
ductible. This result, however, has apparently never been litigated.
The redemption transaction does not present the only opportunity
for examining the allowance of capital recovery in the shareholder/
corporation context. Another example is the consequence of the re-
ceipt of boot by a shareholder in a qualifying corporate reorganiza-
tion.1 6 Following the redemption model, boot may be taxable to the
shareholder as a return of capital and capital gain or as a dividend. l 17
The more interesting aspect of the reorganization model is that a
shareholder may never recognize loss on the shares in a qualifying re-
organization, even if boot is received. l8 Instead, recognition of loss
on the stock is deferred by preserving the loss in the basis of the stock
received in the reorganization. 8 9 If, however, the transaction falls out-
side the definition of a qualifying reorganization, gain and loss recog-
nition is available to the shareholder as if a sale or exchange had
occurred.
184. McCarthy v. Conley, 341 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 57-387, 1957-2 C.B. 225;
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-47-045 (Aug. 25, 1986); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-42-091 (July 24, 1986).
185. B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 141, at 9.01-.35.
186. See, e.g., Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct.
1455 (1989).
187. See id.; Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1978); Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
188. I.R.C. § 356(c).
189. Id. § 358(a)(1). For example, assume Shareholder A exchanges stock in Corporation 1
with a basis of $100,000 and a fair market value of $50,000 for stock in Corporation 2 with a
fair market value of $40,000 and boot of $10,000, in a qualifying statutory merger of Corpora-
tion 1 into Corporation 2. Shareholder A recognizes none of the $50,000 loss inherent in the
Corporation 1 shares. I.R.C. § 356(c). Instead, A takes a basis of $90,000 in the Corporation 2
shares ($100,000 - $10,000 = $90,000) pursuant to I.R.C. § 358(a)(1). The $90,000 of basis
preserves the entire $50,000 loss that went unrecognized in the merger.
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In order to distinguish between the two, subchapter C provides a
complex web of definitional rules for reorganizations,190 which are
supplemented by the extra-statutory requirements of continuity of
shareholder interest, continuity of business enterprise, and business
purpose. 91 These statutory and judicial requirements ensure that the
relationship of the shareholders and the participating corporations
will remain substantially intact, distinguishing a reorganization from a
sale of shares or corporate assets. When the relationship remains in-
tact, therefore, loss is deferred for later recognition and gain must be
characterized as either capital gain or the distribution of earnings, de-
pending on the facts of the particular reorganization.
The redemption and reorganization rules described above illustrate
subchapter C's commitment to capital recovery through tax-free re-
covery of basis or recognition of loss by shareholders prior to liquida-
tion of the corporation or worthlessness of their stock. But capital
recovery is not allowed in all of the pre-liquidation shareholder/cor-
poration exchanges in which shareholders might benefit from capital
recovery. Rather, subchapter C limits capital recovery to those in-
stances in which a significant amount of capital is withdrawn from the
corporate entity and then returned to the shareholder so that there is a
meaningful change in the shareholder/corporation relationship.
2. Rationale for the Capital Recovery Standard
As long as a shareholder's investment remains principally in corpo-
rate solution, deferral of capital recovery is required. When the share-
holder removes a significant portion of that investment from
corporate solution, capital recovery is allowed. Why does subchapter
C use this standard to determine whether capital recovery is appropri-
ate?
The system acknowledges that accurate measurement of a share-
holder's income from the investment in corporate shares requires
some allowance for capital recovery both in the distribution context
and in the loss context. But the limits imposed on capital recovery
serve a different purpose: one often at odds with the goal of accurate
measurement of a taxpayer's income. The purpose is the protection of
the dual entity, double taxation system imposed by subchapter C,
which is based on the fundamental principles that the shareholder and
the corporation are separate taxable entities'92 and that income and
190. See I.R.C. § 368(a).
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (as amended in 1980).
192. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11. These sections are the basis for the double tax of the corporate
model.
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loss realized at the corporate level are not immediately recognized at
the shareholder level. 93 Congress, the Service, and the courts must be
ever vigilant in identifying the distribution of corporate earnings sub-
ject to the second level of taxation at the shareholder level. When a
transaction between a corporation and a shareholder results in a dis-
tribution to a shareholder, this distribution requires careful examina-
tion to determine whether the double tax should be imposed.
Premature allowance for capital recovery, i.e., tax-free return of basis
upon distributions prior to recognition of income, defers collection of
the shareholder level tax and is inconsistent with financial accounting
theory that the shares are nonwasting assets. 94
On the other hand, proper income measurement for the shareholder
requires that if the corporation has in fact distributed some or all of
the shareholder's capital, the shareholder should be allowed a tax-free
return of that capital prior to reckoning gain on the transaction. How-
ever, the system assumes that distributions are made from earnings,
where available, 95 unless a fundamental change in the relationship be-
tween the corporation and the shareholder exists. When this relation-
ship changes, as in a qualifying redemption or a nonqualifying
reorganization, the system assumes that some capital has left corpo-
rate solution. As a result, the interests of proper income measurement
outweigh protection of the double tax so that capital recovery is al-
lowed.
Recognition of losses at the shareholder level is more problematic.
Immediate protection of the double tax does not seem to be at stake
since no income is distributed to the shareholder. The real problem
here is the protection of the dual entity structure upon which the dou-
ble tax system is based. A shareholder obtains the benefits of deferral
of income' 96 as a necessary corollary of the corporate structure. But
the deferral principle burdens the taxpayer as well by precluding im-
mediate recognition at the shareholder level of losses realized at the
corporate level. Simply put, in creating the corporation, the taxpayer
divorces himself or herself from the tax fortunes of the capital in-
vested in the corporation. Premature capital recovery through loss
recognition by a shareholder creates the possibility of deferral of in-
come and current recognition of loss for the same capital investment.
193. Compare the treatment of S Corporations, in which no corporate tax is imposed and no
deferral principle operates. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79.
194. See supra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
195. See I.R.C. §301(a); Clark, supra note 113, at 106-07.
196. Of course, with the reduction of tax rates so that the maximum corporate rate exceeds
the maximum individual rate for the first time in history, this "benefit" may be somewhat illu-
sory. In any event, the corporate model is based upon the deferral principle and its benefits.
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Allowing a shareholder to enjoy the benefits of the corporate model
of taxation without bearing the burdens of the model is obviously in-
consistent with protection of the dual entity, double tax system.
Most important, however, is the question of whether proper mea-
surement of the shareholder's income requires relaxation of the rules
protecting the integrity of the corporate tax model for losses as well as
for income. A shareholder seeking recognition of loss may or may not
receive consideration for the transfer of shares to the corporation. In
a redemption, for example, the shareholder receives the fair market
value of the shares, which, if less than their basis, creates a potentially
recognizable loss., 97 Adhering to the model for gains on redemptions,
proper measurement of the shareholder's income from the transaction
requires an inquiry into whether the corporation has distributed capi-
tal or income to the shareholder.
At first glance, stock surrenders appear to raise the same issues as
loss redemptions in an even more extreme form since the taxpayer
claims an ordinary, rather than capital, loss on the transaction. 98 If
allowed to claim losses on stock surrenders without limitation, taxpay-
ers would have the benefits of future income deferral as well as the
benefits of immediate recognition of losses attributable to a decline in
the value of corporate assets. As a result, they would enjoy the bene-
fits of the corporate model without its burdens. To prevent this, it is
tempting to suggest limiting access to losses on stock surrenders based
on the meaningful reduction standard so frequently used for exchange
transactions. 199
197. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
198. Because no sale or exchange of the surrendered shares has occurred, the surrendering
shareholder claims an ordinary loss in the transaction under I.R.C. § 165(c)(2).
199. As the reorganization and redemption contexts illustrate, the rules for determining
when the shareholder has abandoned the corporate relationship vary from context to context.
Experience with these other contexts sheds light on what type of rule or standard is best suited to
the stock surrender case. Substantial administrative and judicial resources should not be used to
enforce stock surrender standards. Even in the reorganization context, the standards applied by
the courts and the Service to determine qualifying corporate reorganizations have been criticized
as administratively burdensome. See generally The Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985, Final
Report to the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate (May 1985). The better approach would appear to
be a rule, similar to that provided in the redemption context, that determines whether the share-
holder has removed a significant portion of capital from the corporate solution, to provide clar-
ity for the taxpayer as well as minimum administrative burden.
As in the redemption context, the relevant taxpayer must first be defined. It seems as incon-
gruous in the stock surrender situation as in the redemption situation that a taxpayer should be
entitled to a surrender loss when members of the taxpayer's family or entities related to the
taxpayer continue to own most or all of the outstanding stock. If a surrendering taxpayer's
family or related entities own all of the outstanding stock of the corporation, the loss sustained
by the individual taxpayer will be completely absorbed by the other members of the economic
group by the increase in their stock holdings that occurs automatically because of the surrender.
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However, the reasons for using this standard in the exchange con-
text do not lead to a similar result in the stock surrender context.
For example, the Fink situation presents a partial absorption case. In that case, prior to the
surrender, Peter Fink and his wife owned 52.2% and 20.3%, respectively, of the Travco stock.
Other family members owned most of the remaining stock: Peter's sister owned 10.0%, his
brother-in-law owned 4. 1%, and his mother owned 2.2%. Thus, before the surrender, the Fink
family owned, collectively, 88.8% of the Travco stock. After the surrender, the Fink family
owned 87% of Travco. When no new investor appeared after the surrender, Peter and his wife
and mother subscribed to the 700,000 new preferred shares. Thus, after subscription they contin-
ued to own 87% of the common and they acquired 100% of the preferred, which was convertible
into 1,400,000 common shares, representing 5107o of Travco. Upon conversion of the preferred,
the Fink family would own 2,566,346 shares or 93.6% of Travco. When the surrender results in
members of a family or economic unit retaining all or most of the interests in the corporation,
deferral of recognition of loss seems appropriate under principles similar to those of section 267.
As discussed above, see supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text, I.R.C. § 267 mandates non-
recognition of losses until the benefits of property pass outside the members of the economic
group.
Once the determination of the economic group is made, the inquiry must focus on the central
issue of what constitutes evidence of exit from the corporate form in the stock surrender context.
For example, the redemption rules focus on the reduction of the shareholder's interest in earn-
ings, assets and voting power. Without a meaningful reduction in each, exchange treatment is
denied. Are the redemption rules adequate in the stock surrender context, or do the peculiarities
of stock surrenders require different rules? In the stock surrender context, the surrender of vot-
ing power is clearly the most important indicator of a meaningful change in the relationship
between the shareholder and the corporation. If the surrendering shareholder remains in control
of the corporation, directly or indirectly, it seems unlikely that a shift has really occurred in the
relationship between the corporation and shareholder. Here it is important to distinguish the
argument apparently made by the Finks in restructuring their corporation. Had the new investor
appeared on the scene, control would have shifted, but no new investor acquired the shares. The
tax consequences must, of course, follow what actually happened, not what was intended. For a
shareholder without control prior to surrender, a determination must be made of the significance
of the surrender from a practical point of view. For example, where several shareholders hold
stock, the dominant shareholder surrendering a few shares, which do not themselves constitute
control, might significantly change voting power.
The relative weight to be accorded the surrendering shareholder's interest in assets and earning
power is unclear. The stock surrender generally takes place in a troubled company in which
current dividend rights and interest in assets are less important than management rights. See
supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. As a result, focusing on these rights is of less impor-
tance in stock surrender cases than in redemption cases. Thus, in close cases, it may be appropri-
ate to discount the value of a reduction in the shareholder's current interest in earnings and
assets of a troubled corporation. Nevertheless, these rights are entitled to some attention, since
the company may eventually recover sufficiently for the shareholder's interest in assets and divi-
dends to have some value. After all, the shareholder surrenders the stock in order to protect
these economic interests, not voting power alone.
Given these considerations, it appears that the redemption rules, or rules very similar to them,
would suffice as a means of distinguishing shareholders who give up corporate form from those
who do not. Thus, any meaningful reduction in shareholder's interest in voting power, earnings
and assets would result in a transaction in which loss could be recognized; otherwise, the basis of
the surrendered shares would be added to the basis of the remaining shares. In most cases, the
result should be relatively clear. For example, neither the Fink nor the Frantz surrenders would
qualify under this standard since in those cases the surrendering shareholders sought to claim the
benefit of exit from the corporate form while sustaining the fundamental corporation/share-
holder relationship. By contrast, a reduction in shareholdings from 800o to 40o should qualify,
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Stock surrenders differ in one crucial respect from stock exchanges
between a corporation and a shareholder. In a surrender, the share-
holder receives no consideration for the shares, so no capital or in-
come leaves corporate solution. Proper measurement of the positive
income of the shareholder from the surrender transaction does not re-
quire a reckoning of just how much capital and just how much in-
come has been distributed: nothing has been distributed that requires
measurement or division as between income and capital. In the surren-
der context, therefore, the interest of fairly measuring the sharehold-
er's income from the corporate investment need not force a
compromise of the usual rule of deferral of capital recovery. Further-
more, allowing capital recovery in this context would allow the surren-
dering shareholder benefits of the corporate form, future income
deferral, without bearing its burdens on the same capital investment.
Subchapter C prevents this from occurring by forcing the taxpayer
choosing the corporate model for capital investment to accept the con-
sequences of that choice. As a result, a surrendering shareholder
should not be allowed capital recovery, i.e., a loss, unless and until
the surrender results in a complete termination of the shareholder's
interest in the corporation. 200
B. Tax Policy Implications
As noted above, 20' Congress might have provided that capital recov-
ery is never available in transactions between shareholders and corpo-
rations without complete termination of a shareholder's interest in the
corporation by redemption, liquidation of the corporation, or worth-
lessness of stock. After all, while capital recovery may be required for
proper taxation of income, Congress alone determines the appropriate
assuming the reduction was of shares representing a proportionate amount of voting power,
interest in assets and interest in earnings. While this is the result reached by the Supreme Court,
its reasoning offers little guidance as to why this is the proper result.
Finally, the familiar principle of examining a transaction for economic legitimacy is of partic-
ular importance in the stock surrender context because, as a practical matter, stock surrenders
will generally be accomplished by controlling shareholders in closely held corporations. Al-
though a taxpayer need not follow the most taxing path to a particular economic result, in the
stock surrender context other methods of achieving the same results are often available. The.
presence of an equally feasible alternative not involving the surrender might suggest that the
surrender was unnecessary except to reduce taxes, in which case the loss should be denied. For
example, in the Fink case, a change in the conversion ratio for the new preferred shares could
have resulted in a transfer of control to the new investor without the need for a stock surrender.
None of the courts considering the case found this fact interesting as an indication of the bona
fides of the Finks' surrender, yet focusing on such a fact might have suggested further inquiry
into the economic reality of the reorganization plan.
200. This should probably be characterized as worthless stock.
201. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
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time for capital recovery. 20 2 But Congress provided no such rule, and
instead allowed capital recovery at various times prior to liquidation.
In the stock surrender context, the courts originally allowed a loss on
surrender, and the Supreme Court, while disallowing a loss when the
surrendered stock represented a small portion of the shareholder's in-
terest, suggested that a meaningful shift might give rise to an ordinary
loss. 203
What are the policy implications of allowing capital recovery in the
stock surrender context? Since stock surrenders most often occur in
faltering companies, allowing a deduction for capital recovery as a re-
sult of stock surrenders is best viewed as a subsidy to the controlling
shareholders, perhaps to replace the income from the dividends they
might otherwise receive from their ailing companies. This subsidy
might best be justified as a means of maintaining troubled companies
by supporting their shareholders until profitability returns. Keeping
such companies afloat during the 1930's may well have been the un-
spoken rationale for the long line of Tax Court cases establishing the
availability of the deduction for stock surrenders. Allowing a deduc-
tion in limited circumstances such as a meaningful shift in shareholder
participation in the corporation could similarly be justified on the
grounds that it encourages the transfer of corporate control to others
in faltering companies while keeping corporate assets intact and oper-
ating.
But such a subsidy can be criticized on fairness grounds: sharehold-
ers of troubled companies who receive no dividends receive no deduc-
tion, while surrendering shareholders are allowed a deduction. The
two categories of shareholders are similarly situated, except with re-
spect to the unrealized appreciation or depreciation in their shares.
Allowance of the subsidy undermines the fairness of the system by
treating these shareholders differently. Similarly, the allowance of an
ordinary loss for surrendering shareholders but a capital loss for
shareholders who wait until their stock becomes worthless is indefensi-
ble since both groups are in precisely the same situation.
More fundamentally, it has not been proven that the subsidy works
at all in encouraging the desired result. Furthermore, even if it does
work, the use of tax subsidies may not be the most appropriate means
of encouraging such behavior; other methods (i.e., direct transfer,
bankruptcy laws, etc.) may be more effective and less expensive in
producing the desired results. Courts today may be more willing to
allow such companies to founder, or perhaps they at least hesitate to
202. See, e.g., Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
203. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1987).
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use such problematic subsidies to prevent failure. In arguably more
prosperous economic times, when crisis is limited to specific industrial
sectors, general subsidies to the small businessperson may seem unnec-
essary. Perhaps sectors other than small business are the proper tar-
gets for subsidies. Subsidies in general, and tax subsidies in particular,
may be suspect: the intended beneficiaries may not respond in the
manner intended, the subsidies may be abused or may confer benefits
upon unintended beneficiaries. Finally, federal budget deficits con-
tinue to remind even the judiciary that federal tax subsidies are hardly
inexpensive. While it is impossible to know whether any or all of these
concerns actually influenced the result in the modern stock surrender
cases, these arguments for and against the availability of the deduc-
tion as a matter of tax policy should be considered.
Both fairness and the economic effects criticisms raise the question
discussed by Justice Stevens in his dissent to the Fink decision: Which
institution, Congress or the courts, should resolve such questions?204
When the issue is limited to its doctrinal components the courts seem
competent enough to reach the correct result, even if not through the
correct reasoning. However, issues of tax law concern fundamental
questions of revenue and expenditure-issues clearly within the Con-
gressional prerogative. Entrusting such questions to the judiciary
rather than Congress ensures further refinement of various doctrinal
matters rather than the crucial analysis of the "how much?" "why?"
and "who?" of federal budgeting.
IV. CONCLUSION
Stock surrenders, which occur primarily in closely held, troubled
companies, raise fundamental questions regarding the timing of capi-
tal recovery attributable to a shareholder's investment in the corpora-
tion. Trying to determine the proper tax consequences of stock
surrenders by likening them to other, more familiar transactions may
lead to the correct result, or at least a correct result, but will not pro-
vide a useful analysis, simply because stock surrenders do not share
many of the characteristics of these other transactions. This Article
has presented an arguably more informative approach to stock surren-
ders, beginning with the basic questions of loss recognition raised by
the stock surrender, i.e., whether a surrendering shareholder realizes a
loss upon surrender, and if so, whether the Code allows recognition of
that loss. This Article has argued that a surrendering shareholder does
204. Id. at 101-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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indeed realize a recognizable loss, but that the fundamental principles
of subchapter C should preclude recognition of that loss.
Throughout subchapter C, capital recovery is made dependent upon
the shareholder's choice to opt out of the corporate model with re-
spect to a significant portion of the shareholder's capital investment.
This is justified by a need to protect the dual entity, double taxation
system imposed by subchapter C in evaluating distributions and in
preventing shareholders from opting for the benefits of the corporate
form while avoiding its burdens. When in fact the shareholder has
withdrawn corporate capital, accurate measurement of the sharehold-
er's income depends on an allowance for capital recovery, whether by
a tax-free return of capital prior to determining gain or by recognition
of loss. In the stock surrender context, however, protection of the
double tax system while allowing proper income measurement is not
an immediate concern since no distribution has been made to the
shareholder. Allowing capital recovery upon surrender would allow
the shareholder the benefits of the corporate model of taxation with-
out its burdens, allowing future income deferral and current capital
recovery for the same investment which remains in corporate solution.
Essentially, since no capital has left corporate solution, an allowance
for capital recovery for the shareholder is premature. Instead, the loss
must be deferred until the shareholder either disposes of his entire in-
terest in the corporation or disposes of a part of the shares in a trans-
action qualifying as a disposition giving rise to capital recovery.
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